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Abstract
Walrasian equilibrium prices have a remarkable property: they allow each buyer to purchase
a bundle of goods that she finds the most desirable, while guaranteeing that the induced al-
location over all buyers will globally maximize social welfare. However, this clean story has
two caveats: first, the prices may induce indifferences. In fact, the minimal equilibrium prices
necessarily induce indifferences. Accordingly, buyers may need to coordinate with one another
to arrive at a socially optimal outcome—the prices alone are not sufficient to coordinate the
market; second, although natural procedures converge to Walrasian equilibrium prices on a fixed
population, in practice buyers typically observe prices without participating in a price computa-
tion process. These prices cannot be perfect Walrasian equilibrium prices, but instead somehow
reflect distributional information about the market.
To better understand the performance of Walrasian prices when facing these two problems,
we give two results. First, we propose a mild genericity condition on valuations under which
the minimal Walrasian equilibrium prices induce allocations which result in low over-demand,
no matter how the buyers break ties. In fact, under genericity the over-demand of any good
can be bounded by 1, which is the best possible at the minimal prices. We demonstrate our
results for unit demand valuations and give an extension to matroid based valuations (MBV),
conjectured to be equivalent to gross substitute valuations (GS).
Second, we use techniques from learning theory to argue that the over-demand and welfare
induced by a price vector converge to their expectations uniformly over the class of all price
vectors, with respective sample complexity linear and quadratic in the number of goods in the
market. These results make no assumption on the form of the valuation functions.
These two results imply that under a mild genericity condition, the exact Walrasian equi-
librium prices computed in a market are guaranteed to induce both low over-demand and high
welfare when used in a new market where agents are sampled independently from the same
distribution, whenever the number of agents is larger than the number of commodities in the
market.
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1 Introduction
The power of Walrasian equilibrium is often summarized with a pithy slogan: prices coordinate
markets. However, this is not exactly true—a Walrasian equilibrium specifies a price for each good
and an assignment of goods to buyers. The assignment is just as important as the prices, since
there can be multiple bundles of goods which maximize a buyer’s utility at given prices. If buyers
select arbitrarily among these bundles, they may over-demand some goods.
One way to avoid this problem is to assume strictly concave valuation functions ensuring that
each buyer always has a unique, utility maximizing bundle of goods. However, this idea does not
apply in many natural economic settings; for instance, when goods are indivisible. For another
possible solution, perhaps we could use Walrasian prices that eliminate the coordination problem.
For example, with a single good and distinct valuations, a price strictly between the largest and
second largest buyer valuations will eliminate indifferences. However, how do we arrive at such
prices? Relying on a coordinator with full knowledge of the market to solve the coordination
problem defeats the purpose of markets.
In this work, we consider a different approach: natural assumptions on buyers to simplify the
coordination problem. We focus our investigation on minimal Walrasian equilibrium prices, which
result from many natural market dynamics1 [Kelso and Crawford, 1982]. We aim to allocate bundles
of m types of indivisible goods g, each with some supply sg, to n buyers who have matroid based
Valuations2 and quasi-linear preferences; the assignment (“unit demand”) model is an important
special case. We detail our model in Section 2.
We begin our technical results in Section 3, by showing that indifferences at the minimal Wal-
rasian prices can be a serious problem—goods can be in the demand correspondence of every buyer,
possibly leading to all buyers demanding the same good. Clever tie-breaking does not help; for any
tie-breaking rule, the induced over-demand can be as large as Ω(n). (We provide a simple example
in Section 3). Even worse, we observe that the minimal Walrasian equilibrium prices always induce
indifferences.
Hence, we cannot hope to rule out all over-demand at the minimal prices. But, we give a
“genericity” condition on buyer valuations that is the next-best thing: the over-demand for each
good g will be at most 1, independent of its supply sg and the tie-breaking strategy used by buyers.
Therefore, as the supply grows, worst-case over-demand becomes negligible. We warm up with
the assignment model in Section 4, where our condition is simple to state: buyer valuations for
goods should be linearly independent over the coefficients {−1, 0, 1}. To follow, we generalize our
techniques to the matroid based valuations case in Section 5. The situation is significantly more
complicated, but the core genericity definition and proof strategy are in the same spirit.
After we show that exact minimal Walrasian prices generically induce low over-demand, a
natural question is whether this property holds when the same prices are used on “similar buyers”;
we turn to this question in Section 6. More formally, imagine a sample N1 of n buyers drawn from
an unknown distribution Π of buyer valuations. The goods are priced using the minimal Walrasian
equilibrium prices, computed from the valuations of buyers in N1. Now, keeping these prices fixed,
we draw a fresh sample N2 of n buyers from Π, who each choose some bundle from their demand
1Minimal Walrasian prices are focal in other ways: e.g., in matching markets they correspond to VCG prices.
2“Matroid based valuations” are a structured subclass of gross substitutes valuations. In fact, Ostrovsky and
Paes Leme [2015] conjecture that the class of matroid based valuations is equal to the class of gross substitutes
valuations, the largest class of valuations for which Walrasian equilibrium prices are guaranteed to exist.
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correspondence at the given prices (breaking ties arbitrarily). Will the over-demand and welfare
on N2 be close to the over-demand and welfare on N1?
If the supply sg of a good g is small, the difference in over-demand between N1 and N2 may
be large when compared to sg. However, we show that if sg ≥ O˜(m/2), the demand for any good
g on sample N2 will be within a 1 ±  factor of the supply sg of good g. Note that the supply
requirement is independent of the market size n. Similarly, if the optimal welfare for N1, N2 is
large, the induced welfare of the two markets will be within a 1 ±  of one another (and within a
1−  factor of the optimal welfare for N2).
Furthermore, we are able to prove these bounds without any assumption on the structure of
the valuation functions. This lack of structure makes it difficult to argue directly about notions
of combinatorial dimension like VC dimension, and so we take a different approach which may
be of independent interest. Using a recent compression argument of Daniely and Shalev-Shwartz
[2014], we show that assuming fixed but unknown prices, the class of functions predicting a buyer’s
demanded bundle at those prices is learnable using O˜(m/2) many samples. Because this is a multi-
class learning problem, learning does not imply uniform convergence. However, the binary problem
of predicting demand for a particular good is a 1-dimensional projection of the bundle prediction
problem, and hence is also learnable with the same number of samples. By a classical result of
Ehrenfeucht et al. [1989], learning and uniform convergence have the same sample complexity in
binary prediction problems. So, we can bound the VC dimension, and thus the sample complexity
for uniform convergence for demand. Moreover, our bound is tight—even for unit demand buyers,
the VC dimension of the class of demand predictors is Ω(m).
Welfare, unlike demand, corresponds to a real-valued prediction problem, and so the sample
complexity needed for uniform convergence cannot be bounded by bounding the sample complexity
of learning. Instead, we directly bound the pseudo-dimension of the class of welfare predictors by
O˜(m2), again without making any assumptions about the form of the valuation functions. We show
that if the optimal welfare is Ω˜
(
m4
√
n/2
)
, the welfare induced by the Walrasian prices p for N1
when applied to N2 is within a 1−  factor of optimal.
Related work We follow a long line of work on understanding how markets behave under limited
coordination. If buyers’ valuations are strictly concave and items are divisible, Arrow and Debreu
[1954] show that there exist item prices p such that each agent has a unique utility-maximizing
bundle at p, and that when each agent selects her unique utility-maximizing bundle the market
clears. With indivisible items, anonymous equilibrium item pricings may not exist; even when they
do, finding such prices is NP-hard [Deng et al., 2002]). Mount and Reiter [1974] consider the size
of the message space needed to compute Walrasian equilibria, and Nisan and Segal [2006] show
that polynomial communication is sufficient. This stands in sharp contrast to the situation for
submodular buyers, where exponential communication is needed to compute prices which support
an efficient allocation [Nisan and Segal, 2006].3
Our work is also related to the growing area of learning for mechanism design, where a mech-
anism is selected from some class of mechanisms as a function of sampled buyers. Recent work
measures the sample complexity of revenue maximization in the single-parameter [Blum et al.,
2003, Balcan et al., 2005, Blum and Hartline, 2005, Goldberg et al., 2006, Elkind, 2007, Balcan
et al., 2007, 2008, Hartline and Roughgarden, 2009, Babaioff et al., 2011, Cesa-Bianchi et al., 2013,
3the submodular setting, prices may be over arbitrary bundles and individualized to each buyer, in contrast to
the gross substitutes setting, where efficient allocations can be supported by anonymous item pricings.
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Dhangwatnotai et al., 2014, Cole and Roughgarden, 2014, Medina and Mohri, 2014, Huang et al.,
2015, Roughgarden and Schrijvers, 2015, Morgenstern and Roughgarden, 2015] and multi-parameter
settings [Devanur et al., 2011, Dughmi et al., 2014].
In particular, sample complexity results for revenue and welfare maximization using item pric-
ings are known. Most papers consider buyers that make decisions sequentially, avoiding over-
demand from uncoordinated resolution of indifferences. In the unlimited supply setting (in which
over-demand cannot arise), Balcan et al. [2008] show how to learn approximately revenue-optimal
prices with polynomial sample complexity using a covering argument. Extending this work, Balcan
et al. [2007] show how to handle large but limited supply settings and to handle welfare maximiza-
tion. These papers imply that demand concentration will have convergence rates of O˜(k
2
 ln
1
δ );
our result improves this by a factor of k (where k is the number of distinct types of goods). This
percolates into the guarantees regarding welfare concentration, in that our concentration result
requires a weaker lower bound on the supply of each good. Our precise convergence rate for welfare
concentration is looser than theirs in several parameters, in part because we allow buyers to break
indifferences in a worst-case way. Using similar techniques to Balcan et al. [2007], we could recover
similar convergence rates for welfare. Similarly, for the more restricted setting of budgeted buyers
in the online adwords setting, Devanur and Hayes [2009b] show a similar generalization guarantee
for prices. This is generalized to aribtrary valuations by Agrawal et al. [2014], whose convergence
rate depends logarithmically on n and linearly on k; Molinaro and Ravi [2013] removes this de-
pendence on n but has quadratic dependence on k. Our convergence rate is independent of n and
depends only linearly on k, and are therefore faster than any of these previous results.4
We achieve these tighter convergence rates using compression schemes to derive several uniform
convergence results; this compression tool was first used in the context of game theory by Balcan
et al. [2014], who use it directly to upper bound the PAC complexity of a learning problem rather
than to imply uniform convergence over a class.
Our definition of genericity for unit demand valuations has also been called indepedence by
Braverman et al. [2014], Ashlagi et al. [2009]. In fact, our bound of over-demand for generic unit
demand valuations can be obtained from results due to Braverman et al. [2014], although over-
demand was not the focus of their work. However, our analysis extends to more general valuation
functions.
Our genericity results rely on a novel swap graph construction, which bears a slight resemblance
to the exchangability graph of Murota [1996b]. The exchangability graph also has nodes defined
by goods, but without considering a Walrasian allocation and pricing. In contrast, our swap graph
is models indifferences at equilibrium.
2 Model
We consider a market with m indivisible goods, where good g has supply sg ≥ 1. We will write the
set of goods as [m] = {1, . . . ,m} and denote the bundles of the m goods as G = 2[m]. The market
will also have a set N of n buyers, where each buyer demands at most one copy of each good.5
For simplicity, we consider valuations defined over subsets of goods rather than arbitrary sets of
copies; see Appendix A for a formal treatment. For each buyer q ∈ N , let vq : G → [0, H] denote
4We thank Nikhil Devanur for pointing out this related line of work.
5More formally, copies of a good beyond the first copy have marginal valuation zero.
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q’s valuation function. We will assume vq is monotone and vq(∅) = 0. Our goal is to produce a
feasible assignments of goods to buyers.
Definition 2.1 (Allocation). An allocation µ : N → G assigns each buyer a bundle such that the
whole assignment is feasible:∑
q∈N
1{g ∈ µ(q)} ≤ sg for all g ∈ [m].
As is typical, we consider quasi-linear utility functions uq : G × Rm≥0 → R≥0 defined by
uq(S; p) = vq(S)−
∑
g∈S
pg for all q ∈ N and S ∈ G.
We will consider prices assigned to goods—each copy of a good has the same price. We will
write prices as vectors p = (pg)g∈[m] ∈ Rm≥0 or as functions over bundles p : G → R≥0 such that
p(S) =
∑
g∈S pg.
Definition 2.2 (Demand correspondence). The demand correspondence for buyer q ∈ N at prices
p is Dq(p) = argmaxS∈G{uq(S; p)}. We call bundles S ∈ Dq(p) demand bundles. Note that Dq(p)
contains only bundles with non-negative utility, since uq(∅; p) = 0 for every p.
We focus our investigation on Walrasian equilibria, defined by a pricing and an allocation.
Definition 2.3 (Walrasian equilibrium). For valuations {vq}q∈N , we say that a pair (p, µ) of prices
p and allocation µ = (µq)q∈N is a Walrasian equilibrium (WE) if both:
• µq ∈ Dq(p) for all q ∈ N ; and
• pg = 0 implies
∑
q∈N 1{g ∈ µ(q)} < sg .
We call the price vector p a Walrasian equilibrium price vector. Note that there may be many
distinct Walrasian equilibrium price vectors: in fact, the set of all Walrasian prices forms a lattice.
The minimum Walrasian equilibrium price vector p is the Walrasian equilibrium price vector that
is coordinate-wise minimal amongst all Walrasian equilibrium price vectors.6
Likewise, we call the allocation µ a Walrasian allocation. While there may be multiple distinct
Walrasian allocations, it is known that all such allocations must maximize welfare.
In general, Walrasian equilibrium prices p are not sufficient to coordinate a corresponding
allocation µ because buyers might have indifferences (|Dq(p)| > 1). If buyers choose their bundle
arbitrarily, the resulting allocation can violate supply constraints. To measure the amount of
violation, we make the following two natural definitions.
Definition 2.4 (Demanders and over-demand). The set U(g; p) of demanders for a good g ∈ [m]
at price p is the set of buyers that have some demand set containing g:
U(g; p) = {q ∈ N : ∃D ∈ Dq(p) where g ∈ D} .
Then, the over-demand OD(g; p) for g at prices p is the number of demanders beyond the supply
of a good:
OD(g; p) = max {|U(g; p)| − sg, 0} .
That is, the over-demand is the worst-case excess demand if bidders break ties in their demand
correspondence arbitrarily.
6The fact that the price vectors form a lattice guarantees the existence the minimal price.
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To build intuition, we focus the first part of our paper on unit demand bidders, where
vq(S) = argmax
g∈S
{vq(g)} for all S ∈ G,
and non-empty bundles S ∈ Dq(p) are demand goods.7
3 Lower bound
To build intuition for why tie breaking at equilibrium can lead to infeasibility, we give an example
of a market with n buyers in which the over-demand of a good can be Ω(n) regardless of how buyers
break ties, so long as they cannot coordinate with one another after seeing the market instance.8
Lemma 3.1. There exist unit demand valuations such that at the minimal Walrasian prices p,
some good has over-demand Ω(n).
Proof. Consider a market with n unit demand buyers N = [n] and m = n distinct goods. For
a distinguished good g ∈ [m], every buyer q has valuation vq(q) = vq(g) = 1 and vq(g′) = 0 for
all g′ 6∈ {q, g}. The minimal Walrasian equilibrium prices are p = 0, and the unique max-welfare
allocation is µq = q. At these prices, g is demanded by every buyer. Hence, OD(g; p) = n− 1.
Note that if buyers resolve indifferences uniformly at random, n/2 buyers will attempt to buy
good g. While one might hope that the right choice of tie breaking rules would solve this problem,
we show that it cannot. Formally, we will suppose that each buyer q has a tie breaking rule epq
which can depend on vq and the price vector p. Then, we consider the over-demand of a good when
all bidders use their tie breaking rules.
Definition 3.2 (Tie-breaking over-demand). Given a set of prices p, buyers N and tie breaking
rule epq for buyer q, let the demanders of g be
U e(g; p) = {q ∈ N : g ∈ Dq(p) and g = epq(Dq(p))},
and the tie breaking over-demand with respect to ep be
ODe(g; p) = max{|{q ∈ U e(g; p)}| − sg, 0}.
Without loss of generality (by the min-max principle), it suffices to consider deterministic tie
breaking rules when constructing a randomized lower bound instance.
Lemma 3.3. There exists a distribution over unit demand valuations such that for any set of tie
breaking rules, the expected tie breaking over-demand from n buyers is Ω(n).
Proof. The distribution we construct will contain instances similar to the one from Lemma 3.1,
with n unit demand buyers and m = n distinct goods. We choose a permutation σ over the
goods [m] and a distinguished good g∗ ∈ [m] uniformly at random. Once σ and g∗ are chosen,
7Any demand bundle with |S| > 1 must have some good g ∈ S for which v(S) = v(g), by the definition of unit
demand valuations.
8This lack of coordination is formalized by requiring that the tie breaking rule buyer q uses to select among favorite
bundles must be independent of the valuations of buyers q′ 6= q.
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we define buyer valuations such that for all buyers q, vq(σ(q)) = vq(g
∗) = 1 and vq(h) = 0 for all
h 6∈ {σ(q), g∗}. In this market, the minimal Walrasian equilibrium prices is p = 0 and the unique
max-welfare allocation has µq = σ(q) for all q ∈ N . At equilibrium, there is a single buyer q∗ for
whom σ(q∗) = g∗ and Dq∗(p) = {g∗}. For every other buyer, σ(q) 6= g∗ and q has exactly two
goods in their demand correspondence: Dq(p) = {σ(q), g∗}. Each such buyer will select a good
epq({σ(q), g∗}) ∈ {σ(q), g∗} using their tie breaking rule.
Over the randomness of the instance (σ and g∗) we have P [epq({σ(q), g∗}) = g∗] = 1/2. We can
then lower bound the expected tie breaking over-demand for the distinguished good as
E
σ,g∗
[ODe(g∗; p)]
=
∑
q∈N
P [σ(q) = g∗]
+ P [σ(q) 6= g∗] · P [epq({σ(q), g∗}) = g∗]− 1︸︷︷︸
supply
=
1
2
· n(1− 1/n) = n− 1
2
which completes the proof.
While this result shos that over-demand can be high without coordination, it seems rather
artifical—the buyers’ valuations are extremely similar. We will soon give a simple and natural
condition which rules out this example, and more generally ensures that the over-demand for any
good is at most 1 at the minimal Walrasian prices regardless of tie breaking. This bound is the
best possible: for any buyer valuations, minimal Walrasian prices always induce over-demand of at
least 1 for every good with positive price.
Lemma 3.4. Fix any set of buyer valuations {vq : q ∈ [n]}, and let p be a minimal Walrasian
equilibrium price vector. For any good g with positive price p(g) > 0, we have OD(g; p) ≥ 1.
Proof. Let µ be a Walrasian allocation for p. By the Walrasian equilibrium condition, |q : g ∈ µq| =
sg for any good with p(g) > 0. Suppose that OD(g; p) = 0, i.e., g is in some bundle in buyer q’s
demand set if and only if g ∈ µq. In this case there exists  > 0 such that if we set p(g)← p(g)− ,
(p, µ) remains a Walrasian equilibrium—the allocation is unchanged, and every buyer continues to
receive an allocation in their demand set. But this contradicts minimality of p.
4 Unit demand
Now that we have seen how indifferences at equilibrium can lead to over-demand, we consider
whether the over-demand is large for “typical” instances. To build intuition, we start with the
special case of unit demand valuations, where vq(S) = argmaxg∈S{vq(g)}. Such valuations can be
encoded with a real number for each pair of buyer q ∈ N and good g ∈ [m], denoted vq(g). Thus,
without loss of generality an allocation is a many-to-one matching between buyers and goods—each
buyer should be matched to at most 1 good, and each good g should be matched to at most sg
buyers.
We now give conditions on unit demand valuations to ensure that when buyers buy arbitrary
(singleton) demand sets from their demand correspondence at the minimal Walrasian prices, the
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resulting allocation has high welfare and low over-demand. Accordingly, we need to reason precisely
about how the equilibrium prices depend on the valuations. Getting access to this relation is
surprisingly tricky—typical characterizations of Walrasian equilibrium prices are not enough for
our needs. For instance, two standard characterizations show that unit demand Walrasian prices i)
are dual variables to a particular linear program (the “many-to-one matching linear program”), and
ii) are computed from ascending price auction dynamics. The first observation reduces computing
prices to an optimization problem, but it does not provide fine-grained information about how the
prices depend on the valuations. The second observation is useful for computing prices, but the
auction may proceed in a complicated manner, obscuring the relationship between the prices and
valuations.
4.1 Swap Graph
Accordingly, we define a graph called the swap graph of a Walrasian equilibrium (p, µ). This graph
directly encodes buyer indifferences induced by the equilibrium prices. Furthermore, the swap
graph allows us to read off equations involving the prices and valuations. We define the swap graph
as follows.
Definition 4.1 (Swap graph). The swap graph G = (V,E) defined with respect to a Walrasian
equilibrium (p, µ) has a node for each good g and an additional null node ⊥ representing the empty
allocation: V = [m]∪{⊥}. There is a directed edge (a, b) ∈ E for a 6= b, b 6= ⊥ for each buyer q that
receives good a in µ but also demands b, i.e. if µq = a and b ∈ Dq(p) for some buyer q ∈ N . Note
that while there may be parallel edges—representing the same indifferences by different buyers—
there are no self loops.
Since we will phrase our arguments in terms of the swap graph in the remainder of the section,
we will first recast Lemma 3.4 using our new langauge.
Corollary 4.2. For buyers with unit demand valuations and a minimal Walrasian equilibrium
(p, µ), every node in the swap graph G with in-degree zero has price zero.
Almost by definition; the over-demand of a good g is its in-degree in the swap graph.
Lemma 4.3. Let G be the swap graph corresponding to a Walrasian equilibrium. If a node g in G
has in-degree d, then OD(g; p) ≤ d.
Proof. By construction of the swap graph, a node with in-degree d corresponds to a good g with d
buyers with g in their demand correspondence but not in their allocation. Because µ is a feasible
allocation, at most sg buyers can be allocated good g in µ, and since µ is an equilibrium allocation,
g is in the demand correspondence for each of these buyers. Thus, there can be at most sg + d
demanders for good g. By definition of over-demand, we have OD(g; p) ≤ d.
So to bound the maximum over-demand of any good, it suffices to bound the in-degree for every
good in the swap graph. While the in-degree may be large in the worst case, we can introduce a
simple condition on valuations that will rule out these pathological market instances.
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4.2 Generic Valuations
Recall that in Section 3, we showed that over-demand can be high at the minimal Walrasian
equilibrium prices. So, to provide a better bound on over-demand, we need additional assumptions;
ideally, a condition that will hold “typically”. In the lower bound instance from Section 3, over-
demand is large because the buyers have valuations that are too similar. Indeed, consider a market
with two goods a and b where all buyers have the same difference in valuations between a and b.
If some buyer is indifferent between a and b—by Lemma 3.4, this must be the case at minimal
Walrasian prices—all buyers are indifferent. This observation motivates our genericity condition.
Definition 4.4 (Generic valuations). A set of valuations {vq(g) ∈ R : q ∈ N, g ∈ [m]} is generic if
they are linearly independent over {−1, 0, 1}, i.e.∑
q∈N
∑
g∈[m]
αq,gvq(g) = 0 for αq,g ∈ {−1, 0, 1} implies αq,g = 0 for all q ∈ N, g ∈ [m].
Remark 4.5. Note that this condition holds with probability 1 given any continuous perturbation
of a profile of valuation functions, and so for many natural distributions, a profile of valuation
functions will “generically” (i.e., with high probability) satisfy our condition. We also show how to
discretely perturb a fixed set of valuations to satisfy our condition in Appendix D.
Remark 4.6. Our definition of generic in the unit demand setting is also called independence by
Ashlagi et al. [2009], Braverman et al. [2014], although over-demand was not the focus in these
works. In fact, Braverman et al. [2014] give an alternative way to bound over-demand for generic
unit demand valuations (Theorem 4.10). We present the unit-demand case using the swap graph
construction, in order to generalize smoothly to broader classes of valuations.
4.3 Over-Demand
Now, we are ready to present the main technical result of this section: When buyers with generic
valuations select an arbitrary good in their demand correspondence given minimal Walrasian equi-
librium prices, over-demand is low and welfare is high. We will show that the in-degree for any
node in our swap graph is at most 1. This will imply that no good has over-demand more than
1, regardless of its supply. We proceed via a series of properties of the swap graph. First, under
genericity, the swap graph is acyclic.
Lemma 4.7. The swap graph G, defined with respect to Walrasian equilibrium (p, µ) and generic
valuations {vq(g) : q ∈ N, g ∈ [m]}, is acyclic.
Proof. Since the null node ⊥ has no incoming edges by construction, it cannot be part of any cycle.
Thus, suppose that there is a cycle a0 → a1 → · · · → ak → a0 of non-null nodes. We label the
buyers so that buyer qi is allocated ai in the allocation µ, but also has good ai+1 in their demand
correspondence as well (taking the subscript modulo k + 1) for i = 0, . . . , k.
By construction, all buyers are distinct and k ≥ 1. Furthermore, each edge represents an
indifference relationship for some buyer. In particular,
vq(aq)− p(aq) = vq(aq+1)− p(aq+1) for all q = 0, . . . , k.
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Summing these equations and canceling prices, we have
k∑
i=0
vqi(ai) =
k∑
i=0
vqi(ai+1),
contradicting the genericity assumption since all buyers q are distinct. Hence, the swap graph must
be acyclic.
Because the swap graph is acyclic, we can choose a partial order of the nodes so that all edges
go from smaller nodes to larger nodes. For the remainder of the argument, we assume nodes are
labeled by such an ordering (i.e. we now have for every edge (ai, aj) ∈ E implies i < j). Now, the
price of a good can be written in terms of the valuations of smaller goods.
Lemma 4.8. For every good g, the price p(g) can be written as a linear combination of valuations
vq(j) over {−1, 0, 1} for q ∈ N and j < g. Specifically, for every set of goods g1 < g2 < . . . < gk < g
such that g1 → . . . → gk → g forms a path in the graph and g1 has in-degree 0, there are buyers
q1, . . . , qk such that µqi = gi and
p(g) =
k∑
i=1
(vqi(gi+1)− vqi(gi))
where gk+1 = g. If the first node g1 = ⊥, we define vq1(⊥) = 0.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the path length k. In the base case, k = 1 and we have path
g1 → g. If g1 = ⊥ then buyer q1 must be indifferent between the empty allocation and good g, so
p(g) = vq1(g). If g1 6= ⊥, then buyer q1’s indifference between g1 and g yields
vq1(g1)− p(g1) = vq1(g)− p(g),
so p(g) = vq1(g)−vq1(g1)+p(g1). Note that g1 has in-degree zero so Corollary 4.2 implies p(g1) = 0.
This shows the base case.
For the inductive case, we assume that we can write prices in our desired form for any good
with a path of length at most k− 1 from a source node. Consider a good g that has path length k
from a source node. Because buyer qk is indifferent between g and gk,
vqk(gk)− p(gk) = vqk(g)− p(g)
so p(g) = vqk(g)− vqk(gk) +p(gk). Note that p(gk) has a path length of at most k−1 from a source
node, and so we can apply the induction hypothesis to get complete the induction:
p(g) = vqk(g)− vqk(gk) +
k−1∑
i=1
(vqi(gi+1)− vqi(gi)) .
Finally, we can bound the in-degree of any node under genericity.
Lemma 4.9. For generic buyer valuations, every node in the the swap graph defined with respect
to a Walrasian equilibrium (p, µ) with minimal Walrasian prices has in-degree at most 1.
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Proof. Suppose otherwise and let good g be the smallest indexed good with at least two incoming
edges. Then there are two sequences of goods
g1 ≤ . . . ≤ gk ≤ g and g′1 ≤ . . . ≤ g′k′ ≤ g
such that gk 6= g′k′ , g1 → . . . → gk → g and g′1 → . . . → g′k′ → g form paths in the graph, and g1
and g′1 have in-degree 0. We will write g = gk+1 = g′k′+1. By Lemma 4.8, we can express p(g) in
two distinct ways:
p(g) =
k∑
i=1
(vqi(gi+1)− vqi(gi))
and
p(g) =
k′∑
i=1
(
vq′i(g
′
i+1)− vq′i(g′i)
)
,
where buyer qi has µqi = gi and also has good gi+1 in her demand set, and buyer q
′
i has µq′i = g
′
i
and has good g′i+1 in her demand set. Taking the difference, we have
k∑
i=1
(vqi(gi+1)− vqi(gi))−
k′∑
i=1
(
vq′i(g
′
i+1)− vq′i(g′i)
)
= 0.
Since we either have qk 6= qk′ or gk 6= g′k′ , the above linear combination is not trivial and contradicts
genericity.
Finally, by Lemma 4.3 the over-demand for any good is at most its in-degree in the swap graph,
so we have bounded over-demand under generic valuations.
Theorem 4.10. For any set of unit demand buyers with generic valuations and for p the minimal
Walrasian equilibrium price vector, the over-demand for any good g ∈ [m] is at most 1.
As a result, when generic buyers face minimal9 prices p and buy a good in their demand set
while resolving indifferences arbitrarily, the excess demand of any good is at most 1.
4.4 Welfare
Now that we have considered over-demand under genericity, what about welfare? If buyers break
ties arbitrarily, it is not hard to see that welfare may be very bad: buyers who are indifferent
between receiving a good and receiving nothing may all decide to demand nothing, giving zero
welfare. However, if we simply rule out this specific kind of indifference, we can show that genericity
implies near-optimal welfare.
If B is not a feasible allocation, we assume WelfareN (B) is calculated by resolving over-demand
in a worst-case way, as Lemma 4.12 describes below. As an intermediate step in our calculations
we bound a relaxed notion of welfare, which assumes supply is sufficient to satisfy the demand of
all buyers. Given bundles B1, . . . , Bn, we define the relaxed welfare of this (pseudo-)allocation as
follows.
9We show in Appendix B that even with generic valuations, non-minimal Walrasian prices can still induce high
over-demand, further justifying our focus on minimal Walrasian prices.
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Definition 4.11 (Relaxed Welfare). Given n bundles B1, . . . , Bn, the relaxed welfare for a market
N is RWelfareN (B1, . . . , Bn) =
∑
q∈N vq(Bq).
Note that because B1, . . . , Bn may not be a feasible allocation, RWelfareN (B1, . . . , Bn) can
in principle be larger than the optimal welfare obtainable over feasible allocations in the market
over buyers N , which we denote Opt-WelfareN . However, subject to our genericity conditions,
we need only consider allocations that over-allocate any good by at most 1. For such allocations,
the difference between RWelfareN (B) and the welfare of a corresponding feasible solution is small
(and in general, if the over-demand can be bounded by a small quantity, the gap between welfare
and relaxed welfare is small). Furthermore, if B is a feasible allocation then WelfareN (B) =
RWelfareN (B).
Lemma 4.12. Consider a set of bundles B1, . . . , Bn such that |{q : g ∈ Bq}| ≤ sg + d for all g and
some d ≤ sg. We consider two possible ways to convert {Bi} into a feasible allocation {B̂i}.
• Let σ : N → [n] be an ordering of the buyers. For any buyer q ∈ N with bundle Bq, if for
some g ∈ Bq more than sg buyers q′ who precede q in the ordering demand g, let B̂q = ∅.
Else, let B̂q = Bq. (i.e. we let buyers choose bundles in order while supply remains)
Then, B̂1, . . . , B̂n is feasible, and
RWelfareN (B1, . . . , Bn) ≤WelfareN (B̂1, . . . , B̂n)− d ·m ·H.
• For each g, randomly select a subset Ng of sg buyers with g ∈ Bq; let g ∈ B̂q if q ∈ Ng. (i.e.
independently for each good, allocate its supply uniformly at randomly to its set of demanders)
Then, B̂1, . . . , B̂n is feasible, and if buyers are subadditive:(
1− d
d+ ming sg
)
· RWelfareN (B1, . . . , Bn) ≤ E
[
WelfareN (B̂1, . . . B̂n)
]
.
The proof of Lemma 4.12 can be found in Appendix E.
For the welfare argument only, we assume that a buyer chooses a nonempty demand bundle
whenever possible. Subject to this restriction, buyers can break ties however they like. Then, we
can lower bound the welfare of these buyers N in terms of the optimal welfare Opt-WelfareN .
Theorem 4.13. Consider any set of buyers N with generic unit demand valuations bounded in
[0, H] and minimal Walrasian equilibrium prices p. For each buyer q, let bq ∈ Dq(p) be some
arbitrary set in their demand correspondence, assuming only that bq 6= ∅ whenever |Dq(p)| > 1.
Then the welfare obtained by the resulting allocation is nearly optimal:
WelfareN (b1, b2, . . . , bn) ≥ Opt-WelfareN − 2 ·m ·H.
Proof. Let µ be a Walrasian allocation for prices p and, thus, a welfare-optimal allocation so that
Opt-WelfareN =
∑
q∈N vq(µq). We also know that µq ∈ Dq(p) for all buyers q, by the properties of
Walrasian equilibria. Because we also have bq ∈ Dq(p) for every q, we know
Opt-WelfareN −
∑
g∈[m]
p(g)sg =
∑
q∈N
[vq(µq)− p(µq)] =
∑
q∈N
[vq(bq)− p(bq)] .
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Rearranging,∑
q∈N
[vq(bq)− p(bq)] =
∑
q∈N
vq(bq)−
∑
g∈[m]
p(g)sg −
∑
g∈[m]
p(g) · od(g, b) +
∑
g∈[m]
p(g) · ud(g, b)
where od(g, b) and ud(g, b) are defined to be the over-demand and under-demand, respectively, of
good g in allocation b compared to the optimal allocation µ:
od(g, b) = max
∑
q∈N
[1{g = bq} − 1 {g = µq}] , 0

ud(g, b) = max
∑
q∈N
[1{g = µq} − 1 {g = bq}] , 0

Note that od(g, b) ≥ 0, and that minimal Walrasian prices are at most the maximum value H,
and hence we can rearrange the above equations to obtain
Opt-WelfareN ≤
∑
q∈N
vq(bq) +
∑
g∈[m]
ud(g, b) ·H.
Hence, it suffices to upper bound the total under-demand induced over all goods g by b.
Next, note that by assumption, bq = ∅ if and only if Dq(p) = {∅}, in which case it must also be
that µq = ∅. Hence, we have that |{q : bq = ∅}| ≤ |{q : µq = ∅}|. We then have∑
q∈N
|µq| ≤
∑
q∈N
|bq| =
∑
g∈[m]
(|µq|+ od(g, b)− ud(g, b)) , and so
∑
g∈[m]
ud(g, b) ≤
∑
g∈[m]
od(g, b).
Under genericity, Theorem 4.10 implies od(g, b) ≤ 1, and hence∑
g∈[m]
ud(g, b) ≤
∑
g∈[m]
od(g, b) ≤ m.
Thus, we obtain:
Opt-WelfareN ≤
∑
q∈N
vq(bq) +m ·H = RWelfareN (b1, . . . , bn) +m ·H
Finally, applying Lemma 4.12 completes the proof.
Generalization Results for Unit Demand Buyers We now state our main generalization
results specialized to unit demand buyers. Section 6 states the analogous generalization theorems
for buyers with arbitrary valuation functions, and provides the proofs of the general statements.
Fixing some tie-breaking rule e : 2G × V → G for choosing a demanded set from their demand
correspondence;10 we will use Ce(g; p;N) =
∑
q∈N 1[g ∈ e(Dq(p), vq)] to denote the number of
copies of good g demanded in market N at prices p, when buyer q uses e(·, vq) to break ties. Our
first theorem bounds the over-demand for g on N ′.
10For this section, assume only that e(X ) 6= ∅ unless X = {∅}.
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Theorem 4.14. Fix some pricing p and two sampled markets N,N ′ of unit demand buyers, with
|N | = |N ′| = n. Then, fixing a good g, if Ce(N ; g; p) ≤ sg + 1, with probability 1− δ,
Ce(g; p;N ′)− sg ≤ O
(√
m · sg ln 1
δ
+m ln
1
δ
)
.
Thus, for any 0 < α < 4/5, if sg = Ω
(
m ln 1δ/α
2
)
, we have
Ce(g; p;N ′) ≤ (1 + α)sg.
Our second theorem guarantees that the exact Walrasian prices p computed on a market N
will induce approximately optimal welfare when used on a new set of buyers N ′ sampled from the
same distribution. Let WelfareN (p) denote the welfare buyers in N achieve at prices p, assuming
over-demand for a good g is resolved in a worst-case way for welfare.
Theorem 4.15. Fix two sampled markets N,N ′ ∼ Π of unit demand buyers for which |N | =
|N ′| = n. For any α ∈ (0, 4/5), if p are welfare-optimal prices for N and
Opt-WelfareN = Ω
(
H3n.5m2 log4(m) ln2 (m) ln2 1δ
α2
)
then, with probability 1− δ,
WelfareN ′(p) ≥ (1− α)Opt-WelfareN ′ .
5 Towards gross substitutes
Now that we have seen our techniques in the unit demand setting, we will generalize our results
to more general valuations. Ideally, we would like to extend our results to buyers who have gross
substitutes valuations.
Definition 5.1 (Gross substitutes). A valuation function vq satisfies gross substitutes (GS) if for
every price vectors p′ ≥ p and S ∈ Dq(p), there is a bundle S′ ∈ Dq(p′) with
S ∩ {g ∈ [m] : p(g) = p′(g)} ⊆ S′.
Note that unit demand valuations also satisfy GS.
If all buyers have GS valuations, there always exist Walrasian equilibria, and the minimal
equilibrium can be found by following a tatoˆnnement procedure [Kelso and Crawford, 1982]. Gul
and Stacchetti [1999] show that the class GS is in some sense the most general class of valuations
that are guaranteed to have WE.
While GS is an attractive class to target, its definition is axiomatic rather than constructive;
Definition 5.1 shows us what properties a GS valuation must satisfy, rather than how to concretely
construct GS valuations. This poses a problem for defining genericity: it is not obvious which, if
any, valuations in GS satisfy a candidate definition of genericity, so it may be that generic valuations
do not even have Walrasian equilibria!
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Ultimately, we will prove our results for buyers with matroid based valuations (MBV), a subclass
of gross substitutes valuations that is conjectured to be equal to all of gross substitutes [Ostrovsky
and Paes Leme, 2015]. Such valuations can be explicitly constructed from a set of numeric weights
and a matroid, giving us a path to define generic valuations and certify that they are contained in
GS.
However, there are still several obstacles to overcome, and the arguments are significantly more
involved than for unit demand. Roughly, the central difficulty is establishing a connection between
valuations on bundles and valuations on the items in the bundle, since we will require genericity on
values for single goods. While this connection is immediate in the case of unit demand—favorite
bundles are simply single goods—the situation for MBV is more delicate. For instance, some
bundles may contain “irrelevant” goods, which don’t contribute at all to the valuation. Hence, we
propose a more complex swap graph to capture the richer structure of the valuations.
Despite the complications, our high-level argument parallels the unit demand case. We will first
define a swap graph and connect it to over-demand. Then, we define a generic version of MBV
(GMBV) and prove properties about the swap graph for valuations in GMBV. We only restrict to
MBV when defining genericity; our arguments in the first step apply to GS valuations.
5.1 Swap Graph with GS Valuations
To define the swap graph for gross substitute valuations, the core idea is to have an edge (a, b)
represent a single swap of good a for good b in some larger bundle, naturally generalizing our
construction for unit demand. The main challenge is ensuring that we faithfully model buyer
indifferences—which are between bundles of goods—via indifferences of single swaps. More pre-
cisely, in order to bound over-demand with arbitrary tie-breaking, we must ensure that if a buyer is
indifferent between her Walrasian allocation and some other bundle B, then there must be at least
one incoming edge to every good in B. If the swap graph satisfies this property, we can describe
potential demand for goods in terms of in-degree of nodes like we did for unit demand.
At first, we might hope that if a buyer is indifferent between bundles B1 and B2, every good in
B1 can be exchanged for a good in B2 while preserving utility; this would ensure that each good
in B2 has an incoming edge. While this property turns out to not be true for general bundles, it is
true for the “smallest” bundles in a buyer’s demand correspondence.
Definition 5.2 (Minimal demand correspondence). For price vector p and buyer q ∈ N , the
minimum demand correspondence is
D∗q(p) = {S ∈ Dq(p) : T /∈ Dq(p) for all T ( S}.
We call bundles B ∈ D∗q(p) minimum demand bundles, or minimum bundles for short.
Crucially, the minimum demand correspondence for any buyer with a GS valuation forms the
bases of a matroid [Ben-Zwi et al., 2013]. (We give a self-contained proof in Appendix C.)
Lemma 5.3 (Ben-Zwi et al. [2013]). Let vq : G → [0, H] be a GS valuation. For any price vector
p, the minimum demand correspondence D∗q(p) forms the set of bases of some matroid.
By standard facts from matroid theory [Oxley, 1997], all elements of D∗q(p) are the same size.
More importantly, the bases satisfy the exchange property: for B1, B2 in the basis set B of a matroid
and for every b ∈ B1 \B2, there exists b′ ∈ B2 \B1 such that
B1 ∪ b′ \ b ∈ B and B2 ∪ b \ b′ ∈ B.
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Thus if all bundles in a buyer’s demand correspondence have the same size, then we can take B
to be D∗q(p) and we have exactly what we need: for any two bundles in the correspondence, every
good can be swapped for some other good while remaining in the correspondence. Unfortunately,
buyers may prefer bundles of different sizes. We will now introduce the swap graph, and then
explain how it models buyers who prefer bundles of different sizes.
Definition 5.4 (Swap graph). Let buyers have GS valuations, (p, µ) be a WE, and for each buyer
q ∈ N fix a minimum demand bundle Mq ∈ D∗q(p) where Mq ⊆ µq. Define the swap graph
G(p, µ, (Mq)q∈N ) to have a node for every good g ∈ [m] and an additional node which we refer to
as the null node ⊥. There is a directed edge from (a, b) for every buyer q ∈ N such that a ∈ Mq,
b /∈ µq, and there exists B ∈ D∗q(p) with b ∈ B where
Mq ∪ b \ a ∈ D∗q(p).
Further, the graph contains an edge from ⊥ to good b for each buyer q ∈ N with b /∈ µ(q) such that
(i) b ∈ B with B ∈ Dq(p) and B \ b ∈ D∗q(p), and (ii) b has positive price.
There are two main conditions when specifying edges from the null good: (i) involves demand
bundles, while (ii) requires positive price. These two conditions address two distinct problems.
The first condition models cases where the demand correspondence has bundles of different sizes.
Suppose there is some bundle B strictly larger than the minimum cardinality demand bundle. We
need all goods in B to have an incoming edge, to reflect over-demand if a buyer selects B. We
cannot ensure these edges via matroid properties, since B is not a minimum cardinality demand
bundle and so it is not a basis of the matroid. However, there is always a minimum bundle Bmin
contained in B, which is a matroid basis, so we have incoming edges to Bmin.
The following interpolation lemma shows that for every good g ∈ B \Bmin the bundle Bmin∪ g
is also a demand bundle, so the swap graph will also have edges from ⊥ to g, covering all goods in
B as desired.
Lemma 5.5. Consider a buyer with a GS valuation. If we have two bundles B,B′ such that
B ⊆ B′, and B,B′ are both bundles in the buyer’s demand correspondence at price p, then
u(B; p) = u(B′′; p) = u(B′; p)
for any B′′ with B ⊆ B′′ ⊆ B′.
Proof. Let B′′ satisfy the conditions in the lemma statement and define {b1, . . . , bk} = B′′ \B; we
proceed by induction on k. Since GS valuations are submodular,
u(B′; p)− u(B′ \ b1; p) ≤ u(B ∪ b1; p)− u(B; p),
so
u(B′; p) ≤ u(B ∪ b1; p)− u(B; p) + u(B′ \ b1; p).
Since B is most demanded, u(B ∪ b1; p)− u(B; p) ≤ 0. If B ∪ b1 is strictly worse, then B′ \ b1 must
have strictly higher utility than B′, which contradicts B′ being a most demanded bundle. So, we
must have u(B ∪ b1; p) = u(B; p).
By induction we assume that B ∪ {b1, . . . , bt−1} is a most demanded bundle. Using the same
argument as in the base case, we can use submodularity to show that
u(B ∪ {b1, . . . , bt−1}; p) = u(B ∪ {b1, . . . , bt}; p).
Hence, B′′ is a most demanded bundle at price p.
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The second condition for edges from the null good—giving edges only to goods with positive
price—handles a subtle case. Up to this point, we have argued informally that if B is a bundle in
D∗q(p), then all goods in B \Mq will have an incoming edge. We plan to bound the over-demand by
the in-degree, but there is an important corner case: goods with price 0. Such goods can be freely
added to any buyer’s bundle, ruining the bound on over-demand. However, all is not lost: the
problem stems from buyers demanding goods with with zero marginal valuation. We call bundles
with such goods degenerate, and assume (or require) that buyers do not select them.
Definition 5.6 (Non-degenerate). A bundle S is non-degenerate with respect to S′ if goods in S′
have non-zero marginal value:
v(S \ g) < v(S) for each g ∈ S ∩ S′.
When S′ = [m], we will say S is non-degenerate. The non-degenerate correspondence for buyer
q ∈ N at price p is the set of demand bundles defined by
D•q(p) = {S ∈ Dq(p) : vq(S \ g) < vq(S) ∀g ∈ S}.
Minimum bundles are an example of non-degenerate bundles.
Lemma 5.7. Let v be a GS valuation function. If S is a minimum demand bundle with respect to
this valuation and some set of prices, then S is non-degenerate.
Proof. Fix a buyer and a price vector p over goods and some minimum demand bundle S. By
hypothesis, the buyer’s utility u(S; p) must strictly decrease if we eliminate a good from S, i.e.
∀g ∈ S we have u(S \ g; p) < u(S; p). We need to show that v(S \ g) < v(S) for every g ∈ S to
prove that S is non-degenerate. Because S is a minimum demand bundle,
u(S; p) = v(S)− p(S) > v(S \ g)− p(S \ g)
> v(S \ g) + p(g) ≥ v(S \ g)
using non-negativity of the prices.
If we only consider buyers who purchase bundles in D•q(p), there is no problem with zero-price
goods g: for buyers with non-degenerate bundles that contain g, that good must automatically be in
any minimum bundle for those buyers. Hence, buyers cannot be indifferent between non-degenerate
bundle B that contains g and B \ g. So, we only need edges in the swap graph from ⊥ to goods
with positive price.
We are almost ready to formally connect the swap graph with over-demand, but there is one
last wrinkle. Since a buyer is assigned a bundle rather than a single good, they may have two
different swaps to the same good: perhaps Mq \a1∪ b and Mq \a2∪ b are both demanded. We want
to count this buyer as causing demand 1 rather than 2, since they will select a bundle of distinct
goods. This consideration motivates our definition of buyer in-degree.
Definition 5.8 (Buyer in-degree). Consider buyers with GS valuations {vq}q∈N , the minimal Wal-
rasian prices p and allocation µ, and the corresponding swap graph G. The buyer in-degree of node
b is the number of distinct buyers with an edge directed to b.
To prevent buyers from piling on zero-priced goods with zero marginal value, we will require
buyers to take non-degenerate bundles. Then, the following definition of over-demand is natural.
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Definition 5.9 (Non-degenerate over-demand). The non-degenerate over-demand OD•(g; p) for
a good g ∈ [m] at Walrasian prices p is
OD•(g; p) = max{|U•(g; p)| − sg, 0},
where
U•(g; p) = {q ∈ N : ∃B ∈ D•q(p) and g ∈ B}.
Like the unit demand case, this is simply the worst-case over-demand assuming that buyers
choose an arbitrary non-degenerate bundle from their demand correspondence, without any as-
sumption on how they break ties. Finally, we can relate the swap graph to over-demand.
Lemma 5.10. Let buyers have GS valuations and let (p, µ) be a Walrasian equilibrium with minimal
prices. If a node g ∈ [m] in the swap graph G has buyer in-degree at most d, then OD•(g; p) ≤ d.
Proof. Consider any good g. We wish to bound the size of U•(g; p), the set of buyers who have g
in a non-degenerate bundle. These buyers fall into two classes: buyers with g ∈ Mq, and buyers
with g /∈ Mq. The number of buyers of the first kind is at most the supply sg, since M allocates
only fewer copies of goods than the Walrasian allocation µ.
To bound the number of buyers of the second kind, we will show that there is an edge to g in
the swap graph for each such buyer. Consider any buyer q with g /∈ Mq and some non-degenerate
bundle B•q ∈ D•q(p) where g ∈ B•q . Consider any minimum demand bundle B∗q ⊆ B•q . If g ∈ B∗q ,
then there is an edge corresponding to q from Mq to g, since both Mq and B
∗
q lie in D∗q(p) (which
forms the set of bases for some matroid by Lemma 5.3).
Otherwise, if g /∈ B∗q , Lemma 5.5 shows that B•q (p) \ g is also a demand bundle:
vq(B
•
q \ g)− p(B•q \ g) = vq(B•q )− p(B•q )
Since B•q is non-degenerate,
vq(B
•
q \ g) < vq(B•q )
and so p(g) > 0. At the same time, Lemma 5.5 also shows that B∗q ∪ g is a demand bundle.
Combining these last two facts, there must be an edge corresponding to q from ⊥ to g in the swap
graph. So, the number of demanders of the second kind (g /∈Mq) is at most the buyer in-degree of
g, which is at most d by assumption.
Now, we count up the demanders of both kinds: at most sg + d buyers demand g in a non-
degenerate bundle. Hence, the non-degenerate over-demand is at most d.
5.2 Matroid Based Valuations
Now that we have seen the swap graph, we move on to describe our genericity condition on valu-
ations. As discussed above, it is not clear how to define genericity for general GS valuations due
to the axiomatic nature of the definition. We will define genericity for a subclass of GS valuations
studied by Ostrovsky and Paes Leme [2015] called matroid based valuations (MBV). Such valuations
are defined in terms of a simpler class of valuations, known as VIWM.
Definition 5.11 (VIWM). Let X be some ground set and let w be a function w : X → R≥0.
Consider a matroid M = (I, X) and define MS = (IS , S) as the restricted matroid to set S ⊆ X
where IS = {T ∈ I : T ⊆ S}. The valuation induced by weighted matroid (M, w) is
v(S) = max
T∈IS
∑
j∈T
w(j).
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Some examples of valuations induced by a weighted matroid include unit demand valuations
(the matroid has independent sets that are singletons and the empty set) and additive valuations
(the matroid has the power set 2X as its independent sets). For any matroid M = (I, X), the
valuations induced byM lie in GS [Fujishige and Yang, 2003, Murota, 1996a, Murota and Shioura,
1999]. However, Ostrovsky and Paes Leme [2015] show that VIWM is a strict subset of GS by
showing that two operations on valuation functions preserve GS, but do not preserve VIWM.
Definition 5.12 (Merging (convolution)). For any S ⊆ X and valuation functions v′, v′′ : 2X →
R≥0, the merging of v′, v′′ is the valuation defined by
vmerg(S) = max
(S′,S′′)=S
{
v′(S′) + v′′(S′′)
}
.
Definition 5.13 (Endowment (marginal valuation)). Suppose S ⊆ X and valuation v′ : 2X∪Y →
R≥0, where X ∩ Y = ∅. Then, the endowment of v′ by Y is the valuation defined by
vend(S) = v′(S ∪ Y )− v′(Y ).
Accordingly, Ostrovsky and Paes Leme [2015] propose a new class of valuations closing VIWM
under the two operations, called MBV, and conjecture that MBV is equal to all of GS.
Definition 5.14 (Matroid based valuation). Matroid based valuations (MBV) is the The smallest
class of valuations functions containing VIWM closed under finite merges and endowments.
Conjecture 5.15 (Ostrovsky and Paes Leme [2015]). The class of MBV is precisely the class of
GS valuations: GS = MBV.
5.3 Structural results for MBV
In the case of matchings, valuations of goods are described by a single number. When working with
MBV, we will need to get a handle on the value of bundles in terms of the weights on goods in order
to reason about integer linear combinations of weights for our genericity argument. In this section,
we show that an MBV v evaluated on a non-degenerate set B can be written as the sum of weights
corresponding to elements in B plus some integer linear combination of weights corresponding to
the additional endowed goods.
Note that if each buyer q ∈ N has valuations vq in MBV, then we can decompose vq into τq
valuations in VIWM, say
{
v
(t)
q : t ∈ [τq]
}
where each v
(t)
q can be identified with an endowed set
T
(t)
q of goods disjoint from [m], weight function w
(t)
q , and independent sets I(t)q which make up the
matroidM(t)q =
(
I(t)q , [m] ∪ T (t)q
)
. Note that valuations are defined over bundles of endowed goods
and the original goods [m], while the weights are defined over bundles of endowed goods and goods
[m].
We will use the notation Wq(A) to denote the set of weights belonging to buyer q that are
evaluated on elements in the set A, i.e.
Wq(A) = {w(t)q (a) : a ∈ A, t ∈ [τq]} and W (A) =
⋃
q∈N
Wq(A).
We also will write the weights for goods allocated to each buyer in µ = (µq)q∈N as W (µ) =⋃
q∈N Wq(µq).
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We note that each buyer’s valuations vq can be thought of as a tree structure where each node
has at most two children, and where the τq leaves of the tree are VIWM v
(t)
q : 2[m]∪T
(t)
q → R≥0for
each t ∈ [τq], where T (t)q is the union of all goods in endowment operations along the path from
leaf t to the root of the tree; such goods are distinct from the goods [m]. Internal nodes with two
children represent the merge operation applied to the two children. Each internal node with one
child represents an endowment operation applied to the child valuation function. Fig. 1 gives an
example tree of a valuation v in MBV class.
v
(v′′)1,2
(v′)1,2
v1,2
v(1)
W (1),
T (1),I(1)
v(2)
W (2),
T (2),I(2)
J (1)
J (2)
(v′)3:6
(v′)3,4
v3,4
v(3)
W (3),
T (3),I(3)
v(4)
W (4),
T (4),I(4)
J (3)
(v′)5,6
(v′)5
v
(5)
q
W (5),
T (5),I(5)
J (5)
(v′)6
v(6)
W (6),
T (6),I(6)
J (6)
Figure 1: An example for the valuation v that is MBV. The leaf nodes represent VIWMs that
have endowed goods T (t), weights w(t), and matroid with independent sets I(t) with ground set
[m] ∪ T (t) for t = 1, . . . , τ where τ = 6 in this case. When there is a parent node with a single
child, that represents an endowment operation with the set of endowed goods on the edge label,
while if it has two children it is the merge of the two child valuations. Note that in this example,
we would require T (1) = T (2) and T (3) = T (4) because a merge operation must take two valuations
defined over the same set of goods. Also, v has domain 2[m], so that J (1) ∪ J (2) = T (1), J (1) ⊆ T (1),
J (2) ⊆ T (1) \ J (1), J (3) = T (3) = T (4), J (5) = T (5), and J (6) = T (6).
We let the depth of an MBV v be the depth of the corresponding tree, i.e., the length of the
longest path from the root to a leaf.
Now, we want to show that if we have a non-degenerate set S with respect to some valuation
function v, then v(S) can be written as an integer linear combination of weights from each non-
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endowed good in S plus some weights from endowed goods. We will denote by dom(v) the domain
of valuation v which in particular always contains G, i.e. bundles of goods [m].
We first need a useful fact: if S is non-degenerate for an MBV, then every subset S′ ⊆ S is also
non-degenerate.
Lemma 5.16. If v is MBV and S is non-degenerate then for every S′ ⊆ S, S′ is also non-
degenerate.
Proof. We know that MBV is contained in GS and every GS valuation is submodular. Hence, if
S is non-degenerate but we have a set S′ ⊆ S and a good g ∈ S′ ∩ [m] such that v(S′ \ g) = v(S′)
then we can form the string of inequalities, where the second follows from v being submodular
0 < v(S)− v(S \ g) ≤ v(S′)− v(S′ \ g) = 0.
This leads to a contradiction and proves the lemma.
Remark 5.17. Below, we will frequently manipulate formal integer linear combinations without
needing to know precisely what the coefficients are—the important thing is that we are working with
some integer linear combination of the given weights. In these cases, we will abuse notation and
use variables γ with subscripts to represent arbitrary integer values, where different occurrences of
the same variable may not represent the same value, e.g. v(S) +
∑
g∈[m] γgw(g) =
∑
g∈[m] γgw(g)
does not mean that γg is the same integer on both sides of the equation.
Now, we can connect the value of non-degenerate bundles to the weights at the leaf VIWM.
Lemma 5.18. Let v : dom(v) → R≥0 be MBV and composed of τ valuations in VIWM with
endowed sets T =
⋃
t∈[τ ] T
(t) and weight functions {w(t) : t ∈ [τ ]}. If S ∈ dom(v) is non-degenerate
with respect to v, then for each g ∈ S ∩ [m] there exists tg ∈ [τ ] such that
v(S) =
∑
g∈S∩[m]
w(tg)(g) +
∑
w∈W (T )
γww. (1)
Proof. The proof is by induction on the depth of the valuation v. In the base case v is a VIWM
with matroid M = (I, [m] ∪ T ) and weight function w. By definition of VIWM, we know
v(S) = max
S′∈IS
∑
g∈S′
w(g).
A basic fact of weighted matroids shows that the maximum can be constructed using the greedy
algorithm [Oxley, 1997]. That is, we arrange all elements g ∈ S in decreasing order of weight w and
start with a set S′ = ∅, greedily add elements g to S′ as long as S′ ∈ I. We stop when we consider
all elements or when we find an element with negative weight. Suppose we have an ordering σ on
S in decreasing weight such that the greedy algorithm produces an independent set S∗ achieving
the maximum.
Since S is non-degenerate, for each g ∈ S ∩ [m] we have v(S \ g) < v(S). We claim that g ∈ S∗.
If not, suppose we drop good g from the ordering σ. We get an ordering σ−g that orders all goods
in S \ g in decreasing weight. Then, the greedy algorithm ran on orderings σ and σ−g will produce
the same independent set S∗, and hence the same value. But we know that v(S \g) < v(S) strictly,
so g must be in the independent set S∗.
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Since we fixed S∗ before considering g ∈ S ∩ [m], the same argument shows that the whole set
S ∩ [m] must be contained in S∗, and so
v(S) =
∑
g∈S∗
w(g) =
∑
g∈S∩[m]
w(g) +
∑
h∈S∗\(S∩[m])
w(h) =
∑
g∈S∩[m]
w(g) +
∑
h∈S∗∩T
w(h).
This gives our base case.
We now assume that our inductive hypothesis (Eq. (1)) holds for any MBV v with depth at most
k−1 and any non-degenerate bundle S, and we prove Eq. (1) for a MBV v with depth k > 1 and any
non-degenerate bundle S. Since k > 1, v is the result of either a merge or endowment operation.
In the first case, let v be the result of an endowment operation from valuation v′ : 2[m]∪T → R≥0
with endowment set J ⊆ T . Let S ∈ dom(v) ⊆ [m] ∪ T \ J be a non-degenerate set, so that
v(S\g) < v(S) for every g ∈ S ∩ [m]. By definition of endowment,
v(S) = v′(S ∪ J)− v′(J).
We need only show that S ∪J is non-degenerate for valuation v′ to apply the induction hypothesis,
because v′ is a MBV and has depth k− 1. For contradiction, suppose that S ∪ J is degenerate: for
some element g∗ ∈ S ∩ [m] we have v′(S ∪ J) = v′(S ∪ J \ g∗). Then,
v(S) = v′(S ∪ J)− v′(J) = v′(S ∪ J \ g∗)− v′(J) = v(S \ g∗)
is a contradiction, since S is non-degenerate for valuation v. Hence, S ∪ J is non-degenerate and
by the inductive hypothesis, for each g ∈ S ∩ [m] we have tg ∈ [τ ] such that
v′(S ∪ J)− v′(J) =
∑
g∈S∩[m]
w(tg)(g) +
∑
w∈W (T )
γww − v′(J) =
∑
g∈S∩[m]
w(tg)(g) +
∑
w∈W (T )
γww.
If v is not the result of an endowment operation, it must be the result of a merge operation.
In this case, we let v be the merge of two valuations v1 and v2 in MBV, both with depth at most
k − 1. We are given S ∈ dom(v) non-degenerate for v, which gives us
v(S) = max
(S1,S2)=S
{v1(S1) + v2(S2)}.
Suppose that the maximum is achieved at a partition (S∗1 , S∗2) of S. We claim that S∗1 , S∗2 are non-
degenerate for v1, v2 respectively. For contradiction, suppose that S∗1 is degenerate for v1. Then,
there is a g ∈ S∗1 ∩ [m] such that
v(S) = v1(S∗1) + v
2(S∗2) = v
1(S∗1 \ g) + v2(S∗2) ≤ v(S \ g),
but this is a contradiction since S is non-degenerate for v. Thus, S∗1 is non-degenerate for v1; by
symmetry also S∗2 is non-degenerate for v2. Therefore, we can apply the induction hypothesis on
the two valuations v1 and v2: for each g ∈ S ∩ [m], there is a tg ∈ [τ ] such that
v1(S∗1) + v
2(S∗2) =
∑
g∈S∗1∩[m]
w(tg)(g) +
∑
g∈S∗2∩[m]
w(tg)(g) +
∑
w∈W (T )
γww.
Since S∗1 and S∗2 form a partition of S, we can combine the two sums:
v(S) =
∑
g∈S∩[m]
w(tg)(g) +
∑
w∈W (T )
γww,
concluding the proof.
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Corollary 5.19. Let v : dom(v)→ R≥0 a MBV composed of τ valuations in VIWM with endowed
sets T =
⋃
t∈[τ ] T
(t) and weight functions
{
w(t) : t ∈ [τ ]}. If S ∈ dom(v) and there exists a g ∈
S ∩ [m] such that v(S \ g) < v(S), then there exists tg ∈ [τ ] such that
v(S) = w(tg)(g) +
∑
w∈W (S∩[m]\g)
γww +
∑
w∈W (T )
γww. (2)
Proof. We use the same proof method as in Eq. (1).
5.4 Generic MBV
Now that we have defined MBV, defining genericity is straightforward: we simply require genericity
on the set of weights. Each valuation in MBV can be decomposed as a set of weights over the goods
in [m] as well as the goods that have been endowed.
Definition 5.20 (Generic matroid based valuations). We say that a collection of valuations {vq :
G → [0, H] : q ∈ N} are generic matroid based valuations (GMBV) if each vq is a matroid
based valuation and the weights across buyers over all goods [m] and endowments Tq introduced
in endowment operations are linearly independent over the integers. We will write the set Aq =
[m] ∪ Tq. Formally, the weights satisfy ∑
w∈W (A)
γww = 0
for γw ∈ Z if and only if the coefficients are all zero.
By Eq. (1), if a non-degenerate bundle S for a GMBV v then we know that v(S) is a nontrivial
integer linear combination of the weights. This property will be continually used in the results that
follow in bounding buyer-in-degree in the swap graph.
5.5 Properties of swap graph with GMBV
To bound over-demand, our plan is the same as the unit demand case: 1) show that any node with
no incoming edges must have price zero, as in Corollary 4.2 2) show that the swap graph is acyclic,
as in Lemma 4.7, 3) show that we can write the price of a good g as an integer linear combination
of the weights for the goods prior to g in a topological sort of the swap graph, as in Lemma 4.8.
Once we show these three corresponding results, we can bound buyer-in-degree in the swap graph
and hence over-demand, due to Lemma 5.10.
As mentioned before, the arguments are more involved than the corresponding arguments for
the matching case because we need to work around situations where weights for goods may not end
up in the final bundle valuation. A simpler version of this problem can be seen in the matchings
section, where proofs frequently treat the null node ⊥ as a special case—this is because we treat
buyers as all having value 0 for the null node, so it is clearly non-generic. We require more delicate
reasoning for working with GMBV, since there are more opportunities where buyers may have
marginal value 0 for some good.
We begin by considering the source nodes in the swap graph. As we had in the unit demand
setting in Corollary 4.2, any node in our swap graph with no incoming edge has price zero. In
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fact, this lemma does not require valuations to be in GMBV; GS valuations suffice. We point out
that while the analogous theorem in the unit demand case is an immediate consequence of a fact
about the minimal Walrasian equilibrium of GS valuations, we need a bit of care to handle the
more complex swap graph in the present case.
Lemma 5.21. If agents have valuations in GS and (p, µ) is a Walrasian equilibrium with minimal
Walrasian prices then any non-null node in the swap graph G(p, µ,M) with in-degree zero must
have price zero, for any choice of minimum demand bundles M = (Mq)q∈N contained in µ.
Proof. Let the node corresponding to g have no incoming edges. If p(g) > 0 we can decrease the
price p(g) by a small positive value
g =
1
2
×min
p(g), minq∈N
B,B′⊆[m]
{
uq(B; p)− uq(B′; p) : uq(B; p)− uq(B′; p) > 0
}
while not modifying the prices p on other goods; let the new price vector be p′.
We claim p′ along with the original allocation µ forms a Walrasian equilibrium. Evidently µ
continues to clear the market. We need to show that each buyer continues to prefer their allocation
under µ. Buyers who are assigned g under µ continue to prefer their allocation, since their utility
has only increased as we decrease the price of g.
Now, consider buyers q that are not allocated g in µ. By our choice of g, the only bundles B
that q might strictly prefer to Mq at the new prices p
′ contain g and satisfy
uq(B; p) = uq(Mq; p).
By Mq being a minimum bundle, we must have |B| ≥ |Mq|. If |B| = |Mq| then B is also a minimum
bundle at price p, and since such bundles form a Matroid Basis, there must be some h ∈ Mq such
that Mq ∪ g \h is also minimal demand under prices p. By construction of the swap graph, g would
have an incoming edge—impossible.
If |B| > |Mq|, then take any minimum demand bundle B′ ( B at price p. If g ∈ B′ we again
get an in-edge to g via a swap from Mq, while if g /∈ B′ then B′ ∪ g would be a demand bundle
by Lemma 5.5 giving an edge from ⊥ to g; in both cases, contradiction. So, buyers who are not
allocated g also continue to prefer their allocation under µ.
Thus, the new prices p′ and the allocation µ form a Walrasian equilibrium with p′ ≤ p. This is
a contradiction: p are minimal Walrasian prices by assumption.
Next, we show that if we have valuations that are GMBV, then the corresponding swap graph
is acyclic.
Lemma 5.22. Let (p, µ) be a Walrasian equilibrium for buyers with valuations {vq : q ∈ N} that
are GMBV. Then for any choice of minimum demand bundles M = (Mq : q ∈ N) where Mq ⊆ µq,
the corresponding swap graph G(p, µ,M) is acyclic.
Proof. Suppose C = {(a0, a1), (a1, a2), . . . , (ak−2, ak−1), (ak−1, a0)} are edges in the swap graph G
forming a simple cycle. None of these goods can be the null node ⊥ because ⊥ has no incoming
edges. Let buyer qi ∈ N have edge (ai, ai+1) ∈ C (addition in subscript is mod k) so that ai ∈Mqi ;
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note that qi 6= qi+1 for all i, since ai+1 ∈ µqi+1 and ai+1 /∈ µqi by construction of the swap graph.
Because edges in the swap graph indicate indifferences, we have the following set of equalities
uqi(Mqi ; p) = uqi(M
′
qi ; p) so that vqi(Mqi)− p(ai) = vqi(M ′qi)− p(ai+1) i = 0, . . . , k − 1
where M ′qi = Mqi ∪ ai+1 \ ai. Summing this equation over all the buyers in the cycle, the prices
cancel and we have
k−1∑
i=0
vqi(Mqi) =
k−1∑
i=0
vqi(M
′
qi). (3)
Let a be a good in C appearing at position i∗ (since the cycle is simple, i∗ is unique) and q be
the corresponding buyer at this position. Let ` be the number of weights corresponding to buyer
q for good a on the LHS of Eq. (3). Since a ∈ Mq by construction of the swap graph and Mq is
non-degenerate, we have one weight from q for good a each time buyer q shows up in cycle C by
Eq. (1), that is
k−1∑
i=0
vqi(Mqi) =
∑
i:qi=q
vq(Mq) +
∑
i:qi 6=q
vqi(Mqi)
= ` ·
∑
g∈Mq
w
(tg)
q (g) +
∑
i:qi 6=q
vqi(Mqi) +
∑
w∈W (T )
γww
= ` · w(ta)q (a) + ` ·
∑
g∈Mq\a
w
(tg)
q (g)︸ ︷︷ ︸
No weights for good a
+
∑
i:qi 6=q
vqi(Mqi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
No weights for buyer q
+
∑
w∈W (T )
γww.
On the RHS of Eq. (3), we again have a weight from buyer q for good a each time q appears
in the cycle, except for position i∗ where a /∈Mq ∪ ai∗+1 \ a. Thus, there are exactly `− 1 weights
corresponding to q for good a on the RHS of the equation:
k−1∑
i=0
vqi(M
′
qi) =
∑
i:qi=q
vq(Mq ∪ ai+1 \ ai) +
∑
i:qi 6=q
vq(M
′
qi)
= vq(Mq ∪ ai∗+1 \ a) +
∑
i:qi=q
i 6=i∗
vq(Mq ∪ ai+1 \ ai) +
∑
i:qi 6=q
vq(M
′
qi) +
∑
w∈W (T )
γww
= vq(Mq ∪ ai∗+1 \ a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
No weight for a
+
∑
i:qi=q
i 6=i∗
∑
g∈Mq∪ai+1\ai
w
(t′g)
q (g)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
`−1 weights for good a belonging to q
+
∑
i:qi 6=q
vq(M
′
qi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
No weights for buyer q
+
∑
w∈W (T )
γww.
By genericity Eq. (3) cannot hold, so the swap graph must be acyclic.
Once we have acylicity, we can use the swap graph to read off the form of the Walrasian prices.
Just like in the unit demand case, we can trace back from g to a source node. The price of the
source node is zero, and each hop along the swap graph adds a difference of valuations to the price
until we finally arrive at good g.
Because the swap graph G(p, µ,M) is acyclic for any M , we can choose a partial order on the
nodes so that all edges go from nodes earlier in the ordering to nodes later in the ordering. For the
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next result we fix a good g in the swap graph and a simple path g1 → g2 → · · · → gk = g originating
from source node g1 with no incoming edges. We label the buyers such that the edge from gi−1 to
gi belongs to qi. Note that unlike the unit demand case, this path may visit several goods held by
the same buyer (we could have qi = qj and i 6= j). This feature complicates the genericity analysis,
since we need to make sure that a single buyer’s weights do not cancel themselves out.
Lemma 5.23. Given the swap graph G and the simple path defined above, if g1 = ⊥ then there
exists B ∈ Dq2(p) which contains g2 and B \ g2 ∈ D∗q2(p) such that p(g2) = vq2(B)− vq2(B \ g2) and
if k > 2 then there exists tj ∈ [τqj ] for j = 2, . . . , k such that
p(gk) = w
(tk)
qk
(gk) + vq2(B)− vq2(B \ g2) +
∑
2<j<k
γjw
(tj)
qj (gj)+
∑
w∈W (µ)
γww +
∑
w∈W (T )
γww. (4)
Otherwise, if g1 6= ⊥ then there exists tj ∈ [τqj ] for j = 1, . . . , k such that
p(gk) = w
(tk)
qk
(gk) +
∑
1<j<k
γjw
(tj)
qj (gj)+
∑
w∈W (µ)
γww +
∑
w∈W (T )
γww. (5)
Proof. By Lemma 5.22, the swap graph is acyclic and defines a partial order on the goods. Note
that because buyer qk has an edge leading to gk, good gk cannot be in µqk . We will prove the
lemma by induction on k, the number of goods in the path. For the base case, we consider k = 2.
We will first consider the case where the source node g1 = ⊥. By construction of the swap graph
we know that there exists B ∈ Dq2(p) such that B \ g2 ∈ D∗q2(p), thus we have
uq2(B; p) = uq2(B \ g2; p) and p(g2) = vq2(B)− vq2(B \ g2).
Now, if g1 6= ⊥ and k = 2 then we have
uq2(Mq2 ; p) = uq2(Mq2 ∪ g2 \ g1; p) and p(g2) = vq2(Mq2 ∪ g2 \ g1)− vq2(Mq2) + p(g1).
Note that because g1 has in-degree 0, we know from Lemma 5.21 that p(g1) = 0. Further, because
Mq2 and Mq2 ∪ g2 \ g1 are minimum demand bundles for q2 we can apply Eq. (1): for each g ∈Mq2
there exists tg ∈ [τq2 ], and for each g ∈Mq2 ∪ g2 \ g1 there exists t′g ∈ [τq2 ] such that
p(g2) =
∑
g∈Mq2∪g2\g1
w
(t′g)
q2 (g)−
∑
g∈Mq2
w
(tg)
q2 (g) +
∑
w∈W (T )
γww
= w
(t′g2 )
q2 (g2) +
∑
w∈Wq2 (µq2 )
γww +
∑
w∈W (T )
γww.
We now consider the inductive case when the length of the path is k > 2. Let us assume that
g1 = ⊥ and Eq. (4) holds for good gk−1. By construction of the swap graph, we know that buyer
qk is indifferent to receiving Mqk or M
′
qk
= Mqk ∪ gk \ gk−1 where gk /∈ µqk . We then have,
p(gk) = vqk(M
′
qk
)− vqk(Mqk) + p(gk−1).
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We then apply the inductive hypothesis on p(gk−1) for g1 = ⊥. We will use Eq. (1) to conclude
that for each g ∈ Mqk there exists tg ∈ [τqk ], for each g ∈ M ′qk there is a t′g ∈ [τqk ], for each g < k
there is a t′′g ∈ [τqg ], and for some B ∈ Dq2(p) where B \ g2 ∈ D∗q2(p) we have
p(gk) =
∑
g∈M ′qk
w
(t′g)
qk (g)−
∑
g∈Mqk
w
(tg)
qk (g) + w
(t′′k−1)
qk−1 (gk−1) + vq2(B)− vq2(B \ g2)
+
∑
2<j<k−1
γjw
(t′′i )
qj (gj) +
∑
w∈W (µ)
γww +
∑
w∈W (T )
γww
= w
(t′k)
qk (gk) + vq2(B)− vq2(B \ g2) +
∑
2<j<k
γjw
(t′′j )
qj (gj) +
∑
w∈W (µ)
γww +
∑
w∈W (T )
γww.
Proving Eq. (5) for g1 6= ⊥ follows similarly, where there exists tj ∈ [τqj ] for each j = 2, · · · , k
such that
p(gk) = vqk(M
′
qk
)− vqk(Mqk) + p(gk−1) = vqk(M ′qk)− vqk(Mqk) + w
(tk−1)
qk−1 (gk−1)
+
∑
1<j<k−1
γjw
(tj)
qj (gj) +
∑
w∈W (µ)
γww +
∑
w∈W (T )
γww
= w(tk)qk (g) +
∑
1<j<k
γjw
(tj)
qj (gj) +
∑
w∈W (µ)
γww +
∑
w∈W (T )
γww.
By Lemma 5.21, goods with zero in-degree must have price 0. Also, goods with positive in-
degree must have strictly positive price under genericity. (This fact is also true in the unit demand
case, but we did not need it there.)
Corollary 5.24. Let (p, µ) be a Walrasian equilibrium and G(p, µ,M) be the corresponding swap
graph for any M . Any good with positive in-degree in G will have positive price.
Proof. Suppose g has positive in-degree. Let g1 → g2 → · · · → gk = g be a simple path originating
from source node g1 to g with the incoming edge to gi corresponding to buyer qi. If g1 6= ⊥, then
Eq. (5) implies p(g) > 0 because no terms could cancel with w
(tk)
qk (gk) by genericity.
Otherwise, g1 = ⊥. If the path is of length 2 (k = 2), g has an edge from the null good and
must have positive price by construction of the swap graph. So, suppose k > 2. By construction of
the swap graph, we know that there exists Q2 ∈ Dq2(p) such that if we eliminate g2 from it, then
we will have a minimum demand bundle, i.e. Q2 \ q2 ∈ D∗q2(p). From Eq. (2), we can write the
valuation vq2(Q2) in terms of the weights corresponding to elements inside of Q2 that belong to q2
and an integer linear combination of the weights for the endowed goods T , i.e.
vq2(Q2) = w
(t2)
q2 (g2) +
∑
w∈Wq2 (Q2\g2)
γww +
∑
w∈W (T )
γww.
Further, because Q2 \ g2 ∈ D∗q2(p), we know from Eq. (1) that we can write vq2(Q2 \ g2) as a sum
of weights corresponding to elements in Q2 \ g2 plus an integer linear combination of weights from
the endowed goods:
vq2(Q2 \ g2) =
∑
a∈Q2\g2
w(ta)q2 (a) +
∑
w∈W (T )
γww.
27
We then use Eq. (4) to write p(g) as
p(g) = w(t)q (g) + vq2(Q2)− vq2(Q2 \ g2) +
∑
2<j<k
γjw
(tj)
qj (gj) +
∑
w∈W (µ)
γww +
∑
w∈W (T )
γww
= w(t)q (g) + w
(t2)
q2 (g2) +
∑
w∈Wq2 (Q2\g2)
γww +
∑
2<j<k
γjw
(tj)
qj (gj) +
∑
w∈W (µ)
γww +
∑
w∈W (T )
γww.
Recall that g 6= g2, . . . , gk−1. If q 6= q2, there would be the weight w(t)q (g) left that would not be
able to cancel with any other term, due to genericity. Thus, we consider q = q2. It may be the
case that Q2 contains g and some weight from Wq2(Q2 \ g2) cancels with w(t)q (g). However, the
weight w
(t2)
q2 (g2) cannot cancel with any other term, due to genericity and all goods along the path
are distinct. Thus, in any case there is some weight that remains and so p(g) 6= 0 by genericity, so
p(g) > 0.
5.6 Bounding the Buyer In-Degree
We are now ready to prove our final property of the swap graph, by bounding the buyer in-degree
under genericity. This result corresponds to Lemma 4.9 from the unit demand case, and crucially
uses the fact that the null node only has edges to goods with strictly positive price; if we allowed
edges from the null node to price zero goods, every bidder would have such an edge and bidder
in-degree could be as large as n, rather than bounded by 1.
Theorem 5.25. For GMBV buyers and Walrasian equilibrium (p, µ) with minimal Walrasian
prices, each node in the swap graph G has buyer in-degree at most 1.
Proof. We will use Eq. (5) to prove this and so we relabel the nodes in the swap graph G(p, µ,M)
using the usual partial ordering—all edges go from a lower indexed node to a higher indexed node.
Consider a node g with buyer in-degree more than 1. We know that its price p(g) satisfies Eq. (4)
or Eq. (5), depending on whether there is a path originating from a source node g1 to g in the swap
graph with g1 = ⊥ or g1 6= ⊥, respectively. We will write T as the set of all endowed goods for all
agents.
Suppose good g has at least two incoming edges where two edges belong to different buyers q
and r. We consider two paths to g: g1, g2, . . . , gk = g and h1, h2, . . . , h` = g, where g1 and h1 are
source nodes, the edge to gi belongs to qi and the edge to hi belongs to ri with qk = q and r` = r.
There are three cases:
1) Both paths originate at a source node that is non-null, i.e. g1, h1 6= ⊥.
2) Exactly one of the source nodes along a path is from the null node, i.e. g1 = ⊥, h1 6= ⊥.
3) The source nodes along both paths are from the null node, i.e. g1, h1 = ⊥.
For case 1), we have two paths to g and by Eq. (5) we can write p(g) in two different ways.
For each gj there exists tj ∈ [τqj ] for j = 1, . . . , k as well as for each hj there exists t′j ∈ [τrj ] for
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j = 1, . . . , ` such that
p(g) = w(tk)q (g) +
∑
1<j<k
γjw
(tj)
qj (gj) +
∑
w∈W (µ)
γww +
∑
w∈W (T )
γww (LHS-1)
p(g) = w
(t′`)
r (h) +
∑
1<j<`
γjw
(t′j)
rj (hj) +
∑
w∈W (µ)
γww +
∑
w∈W (T )
γww. (RHS-1)
Consider the weight w
(tk)
q (gk) on LHS-1. There is no other term in LHS-1 that can cancel with it
because the weights are generic and all goods gj 6= g for j < k. Further, good g is not in buyer
q’s allocation µq, so w
(tk)
q (g) /∈ W (µ) and g is not an endowed good so w(tk)q (g) /∈ W (T ). Also, no
term in RHS-1 can cancel with w
(tk)
q (g) because r 6= q. This gives a non-trivial linear combination
contradicting genericity, completing case 1).
For case 2), the two paths that terminate at g in the swap graph have two different types of
source nodes, say g1 = ⊥ and h1 6= ⊥. When k > 2, we have
p(g) = w(tk)q (g) + vq2(Q2 ∪ g2)− vq2(Q2) +
∑
2<j<k
γjw
(tj)
qj (gj) +
∑
w∈W (µ)
γww +
∑
w∈W (T )
γww
(LHS-2)
p(g) = w
(t′`)
r (g) +
∑
1<j<`
γjw
(t′j)
rj (hj) +
∑
w∈W (µ)
γww +
∑
w∈W (T )
γww, (RHS-2)
Note that if g /∈ Q2 then the term w(tk)q (g) for q 6= r could not cancel with any term in LHS-2 due
to genericity as we have argued before. Further, this weight would also not cancel with any term
in RHS-2 because q 6= r and the weights are generic.
We now consider the case that g ∈ Q2. Note that by monotonicity we have vq2(Q2 ∪ g2) ≥
vq2(Q2 ∪ g2 \ g). If this were an equality we would have the following relation
uq2(Q2 ∪ g2; p) = uq2(Q2 ∪ g2 \ g; p)− p(g) < uq2(Q2 ∪ g2 \ g; p)
since g has positive price from Corollary 5.24. This is a contradiction because Q2 ∪ g2 is a demand
bundle of q2. Hence we must have vq2(Q2 ∪ g2) > vq2(Q2 ∪ g2 \ g) and we can apply Eq. (2) to
conclude that for some t∗ ∈ [τq2 ],
vq2(Q2 ∪ g2) = w(t
∗)
q2 (g) +
∑
w∈Wq2 (Q2∪g2\g)
γww +
∑
w∈W (T )
γww.
We have Q2 ∈ D∗q2(p) so we can apply Eq. (1) to write vq2(Q2) as a sum of weights, where s∗ ∈ [τq2 ],
we can rewrite LHS-2 to get
p(g) =w(tk)q (g) + w
(t∗)
q2 (g)− w(s
∗)
q2 (g) +
∑
w∈Wq2 (Q2∪g2\g)
γww
+
∑
2<j<k
γjw
(t′j)
qj (gj) +
∑
w∈W (µ)
γww +
∑
w∈W (T )
γww.
Note that we have three weights corresponding to good g and it may be the case that tk = t
∗ = s∗.
By genericity, two of these weights may cancel (if they are identical) but there will be at least
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one weight that does not cancel. By genericity this could not cancel with any term on the RHS-2,
since those weights are for buyers different from q. Thus, we get a non-trivial linear combination,
contradicting genericity.
Note if k = 2, we know that g = g2 and vq(Q2 ∪ g) − vq(Q2) > 0 (the price of g is positive) .
Thus, vq(Q2 ∪ g) must contain a weight for g belonging to q, by Eq. (2), that cannot cancel with
the weight w
(t′)
r (g) in the RHS-2 due to q 6= r and genericity. Hence, either way in case 2) we get
a contradiction.
We now consider our last case 3), g1, h1 = ⊥. We will need to consider three subcases without
loss of generality: a) k = ` = 2; b) k = 2, ` > 2; c) k, ` > 2. For our first subcase a), we can write
the price of g in two different ways, according to Eq. (5):
p(g) = vq(Q ∪ g)− vq(Q) and p(g) = vr(R ∪ g)− vr(R),
where Q,R are minimum bundles for bidders q and r respectively, and Q ∪ g,R ∪ g are demand
bundles (but not minimum) for bidders q and r. Crucially, we also know that p(g) > 0, by
construction of the swap graph. Therefore, Q ∪ g and R ∪ g must be non-degenerate with respect
to g, for instance
vq(Q)− p(Q) = vq(Q ∪ g)− p(Q ∪ g) = vq(Q ∪ g)− p(Q)− p(g) < vq(Q ∪ g)− p(Q),
so vq(Q) < vq(Q ∪ g); the same argument applies to R ∪ g. Furthermore, since Q and R are
minimum, they are also non-degenerate by Lemma 5.7. Combined with Eq. (1) applied to Q ∪ g
and R ∪ g, we have
p(g) = vq(Q ∪ g)− vq(Q) = w(t)q (g) +
∑
w∈Wq(Q)
γww +
∑
w∈W (T )
γww, (LHS-3a)
p(g) = vr(R ∪ g)− vr(R) = w(t′)r (g) +
∑
w∈Wr(R)
γww +
∑
w∈W (T )
γww. (RHS-3a)
However, LHS-3a consists of integer linear combinations of weights for buyer q, while the right hand
side RHS-3a only has integer linear combinations of the weights for buyer r, leading to a non-trivial
linear combination contradicting genericity.
For subcase b) we can write the prices in two ways:
p(g) =vq(Q ∪ g)− vq(Q) = w(t)q (g) +
∑
w∈Wq(Q)
γww +
∑
w∈W (T )
γww, (LHS-3b)
p(g) =w
(t′`)
r (g) + vr2(R2 ∪ h2)− vr2(R2) +
∑
2<j<`
γjw
(tj)
rj (hj) +
∑
w∈W (µ)
γww +
∑
w∈W (T )
γww
(RHS-3b)
where Q is some minimum demand bundle for q that does not contain g and R2 is some minimum
demand bundle for buyer r2 that does not contain h2. If r2 6= r then the term w(t
′
`)
r (g) in RHS-3b
cannot cancel with any term in LHS-3b, due to genericity. If r2 = r then there is no term in RHS-3b
that can cancel with w
(t)
q (g) on the LHS-3b because of genericity and q 6= r.
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We then consider our last subcase c), when k, ` > 2. We then use Eq. (5) to write the price of
good g in two ways, where Q2 is some minimum demand bundle for q2 that does not contain g2
and R2 is some minimum demand bundle for buyer r2 that does not contain h2:
p(g) = w(tk)q (g) + vq2(Q2 ∪ g2)− vq2(Q2) +
∑
2<j<k
γjw
(tj)
qj (gj) +
∑
w∈W (µ)
γww +
∑
w∈W (T )
γww
(LHS-3c)
p(g) = w
(t′`)
r (g) + vr2(R2 ∪ h2)− vr2(R2) +
∑
2<j<`
γjw
(t′j)
rj (hj) +
∑
w∈W (µ)
γww +
∑
w∈W (T )
γww
(RHS-3c)
Note that if g /∈ Q2 and g /∈ R2, then the term w(tk)q (g) for q 6= r could not cancel with any term
above due to genericity as we have argued before. Otherwise, without loss of generality g ∈ Q2.
(The case with g ∈ R2 follows by symmetry.) As we argued above in case 2, we can rewrite the
price of g in LHS-3c as
p(g) =w(tk)q (g) + w
(t∗)
q2 (g)− w(s
∗)
q2 (g) +
∑
w∈Wq2 (Q2∪g2\g)
γww
+
∑
2<j<k
γjw
(t′j)
qj (gj) +
∑
w∈W (µ)
γww +
∑
w∈W (T )
γww.
Following the same argument as in case 2, we know that there exists at least one weight belonging
to buyer q for good g. Similarly, there exists at least one weight (note that it can be the case
that tk = t
∗ = s∗) belonging to buyer r for good g. By genericity these two weights cannot cancel
because q 6= r.
Hence, the buyer in-degree to any node in the swap graph is at most 1.
We now analyze the case where buyers are told to take a most demand bundle that is non-
degenerate, i.e. each buyer q takes a bundle from D•q(p). We have already shown that the swap
graph has buyer in-degree at most 1 and so we apply Lemma 5.10 to obtain the following result.
Theorem 5.26. Let (p, µ) be a Walrasian Equilibrium with minimal Walrasian prices p. If buyers
have valuations in GMBV and each buyer chooses only non-degenerate bundles at prices p, then
the over-demand for any good g ∈ [m] is at most 1, i.e.
OD•(g; p) ≤ 1, ∀g ∈ [m].
5.7 Bounding welfare
So far, we have shown that over-demand can be no more than one when buyers select any non-
degenerate bundle in their demand correspondence at the minimal Walrasian prices. Much like the
case for matchings, where we assumed that buyers broke ties in favor of selecting a good in their
demand correspondence (rather than selecting the empty set), we will assume that buyers break
ties in favor of the largest cardinality non-degenerate bundles in their demand correspondence—i.e.
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we will assume that buyers select arbitrary bundles in what we will call the max non-degenerate
correspondence Dmaxq (p) for buyer q at price p where
Dmaxq (p) = {Dq ∈ D•q(p) : |Dq| ≥ |D′q|, ∀D′q ∈ D•q(p)}. (6)
Under this tie-breaking condition, buyers achieve nearly optimal welfare.
Theorem 5.27. Let buyers have GMBV {vq : G → [0, H]}q∈N in a market in which there are sg
copies of each good g ∈ [m]. At the minimal Walrasian prices p, if each buyer q selects any max
non-degenerate bundle Bmaxq ∈ Dmaxq (p), then welfare will be near optimal:
WelfareN (B
max
1 , · · · , Bmaxn ) ≥ Opt-WelfareN − 2H ·m.
Proof. Without loss of generality we will assume that the Walrasian allocation µ is non-degenerate;
if it were not, we could remove from each allocated bundle all goods with zero marginal valuation
while remaining in a buyer’s demand set and thus we would obtain the same welfare as the original
allocation. Note that the welfare from µ is equal to Opt-WelfareN .
Let Bmax = (Bmax1 , . . . , B
max
n ) denote a collection of max non-degenerate bundles at price p,
one per buyer. We know that |Bmaxq | ≥ |µq| by maximality, so Bmax contains at least as many
goods as µ. Note that the utility each buyer receives from the allocation µ is the same as the utility
they receives from her bundle in Bmax. As we did in the proof of Theorem 4.13, we sum over all
buyers’ utilities to get∑
q∈N
[vq(µq)− p(µq)] =
∑
q∈N
vq(µq)−
∑
g∈[m]
p(g)sg =
∑
q∈N
[
vq(B
max
q )− p(Bmaxq )
]
=
∑
q∈N
vq(B
max
q )−
∑
g∈[m]
p(g)sg +
∑
g∈[m]
p(g) · ud(g,Bmax)−
∑
g∈[m]
p(g) · od(g,Bmax).
where we define the over-demand (od) and under-demand (ud), respectively, of good g in the tuple
of bundles Bmax compared to the optimal allocation µ as
od(g,Bmax) = max
∑
q∈N
(
1{g ∈ Bmaxq } − 1{g ∈ µq}
)
, 0

ud(g,Bmax) = max
∑
q∈N
(
1{g ∈ µq} − 1{g ∈ Bmaxq }
)
, 0
 .
Note that the od(g,Bmax) ≥ 0 and so we get the following inequality:
Opt-WelfareN ≤
∑
q∈N
vq(B
max
q ) +
∑
g∈[m]
p(g) · ud(g,Bmax) ≤
∑
q∈N
vq(B
max
q ) +H
∑
g∈[m]
ud(g,Bmax).
To bound the right hand side, we will bound the total under demand of all goods from allocation
Bmax relative to µ.
We now use the fact that Bmaxq is a max non-degenerate bundle, so we have∑
q∈N
|µq| ≤
∑
q∈N
|Bmaxq | =
∑
q∈N
|µq|+
∑
g∈[m]
(od(g,Bmax)− ud(g,Bmax))
∑
g∈[m]
ud(g,Bmax) ≤
∑
g∈[m]
od(g,Bmax).
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To bound the over demand for each good from Bmax relative to µ, we again turn to the swap
graph. We first bound how many more goods are allocated by Bmax compared to µ. We consider
buyers q ∈ N and good g where g ∈ Bmaxq and g /∈ µq. Let B∗q be any minimum demand
bundle contained in Bmaxq . If g ∈ B∗q then we know that there will be an edge to g in the swap
graph G(p, µ,M) for any choice of minimum demand bundles M = (M1, . . . ,Mn) contained in µ.
Otherwise, if g /∈ B∗q then we know that Bmaxq \g is also a most demanded bundle from Lemma 5.5.
We further know that p(g) > 0, due to vq(B
max
q ) > vq(B
max
q \ g) (Bmaxq is non-degenerate). So,
there is an edge from ⊥ to g in G(p, µ,M) for any choice of minimum demand bundles M . Hence,
every good that Bmax allocates over µ has at least one incoming edge.
Because the buyer in-degree in G(p, µ,M) is at most one for any choice of minimum demand
bundles M , we know that for each good g there is at most one buyer q where g ∈ Bmaxq but g /∈ µq.
Hence, we get od(g,Bmax) ≤ 1 for each g ∈ [m]:
Opt-WelfareN ≤
∑
q∈N
vq(B
max
q ) +m ·H = RWelfareN (b1, . . . , bn) +m ·H.
Finally, applying Lemma 4.12 completes the proof.
6 Welfare and over-demand generalization
In this section, we show that Walrasian prices generalize: the equilibrium prices for a market N
of buyers induces similar behavior when presented to a new sample N ′ of buyers, both in terms of
the demand for each good and in terms of welfare. More precisely, a set of prices which minimizes
over-demand of each good and maximizes welfare when each buyer purchases her most-preferred
bundle retains these properties (approximately) on a new market N ′ when each buyer purchases her
most-preferred bundle, if buyers in N and N ′ are drawn independently from the same distribution.
6.1 Results for Arbitrary Valuations
We need a bit more notation to formally state the generalization guarantees for more general
valuations. To foramlize how over-demand and welfare induced by prices p vary between two
markets, we first fix a tie-breaking rule e that buyers use to select amongst demanded bundles for a
valuation from set V. We define classes of functions parameterized by pricings mapping valuations
to (a) bundles purchased, (b) whether or not a particular good g is purchased, and (c) the value a
buyer gets for her purchased bundle.
For technical convenience, we will assume all buyers choose bundles from their demand sets
in the following systematic way (still independent of other buyers’ choices). First, each buyer q
will have some set Lvq of “infeasible” bundles they will never choose to buy. For instance, we will
prevent buyers from buying items for which they get zero marginal utility: if v(B) = v(B ∪ {g})
for g /∈ B, having B ∪ {g} ∈ Lvq forces q to avoid the unnecessarily larger bundle (needed for
over-demand guarantees). Second, all buyers share some standard “linear” choice rule over the
elements of the remaining bundles in their demand set; we use the rule to break ties in favor of
larger demanded bundles, needed for welfare guarantees.
Below we formally define an encodable tie-breaking rule, which we will need for our concentra-
tion results for demand and welfare.
Definition 6.1 (Encodable tie-breaking). A function e : 2G × V → G is an encodable rule if
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• e(X , v) ∈ X ;
• there exists a vector y ∈ (R≥0)m (called a separator), and a subset Lvq ⊆ 2G (called the
infeasible set for buyer q) such that, for all X , e(X , v) /∈ Lv, and
∑
g∈e(X ,v) yg >
∑
g∈B′ yg
for any other B′ ∈ X \ Lvq ; and
• at any pricing p there is at least one utility-maximizing bundle for each valuation that lies
outside the infeasible set Lvq .
We show in Lemma F.3 that there exists an encodable tie-breaking rule over demand sets which
selects bundles satisfying the properties needed for our over-demand and welfare results to hold
(Theorems 4.10 and 4.13) in the case of unit demand buyers, and the properties needed for the
analogous results (Theorems 5.26 and 5.27) in the case of GMBV buyers. For the remainder of
this section, we fix some encodable tie-breaking rule e and state our results with respect to this
rule. We call the bundle that e selects from Dq(p) the canonical bundle for q at p, denoted by
B∗q (p) = e (Dq(p), vq). Then, for each good g, let hg,p(vq) = 1[g ∈ B∗q (p)] indicate whether or not g
is in q’s canonical bundle at prices p. Let Ce(g; p;N) =
∑
q∈N hg,p(vq), i.e. the number of buyers
in N whose canonical bundle at p contains g. For a sample of n buyers {vq} i.i.d.∼ Π, let Ce(g; p; Π)
represent the expected number of copies of g demanded at prices p if buyers demand canonical
bundles. Similarly, let the welfare of a pricing p on a market N be WelfareN (p) =
∑
q∈N vq(B̂∗q (p))
for B̂∗q (p) a worst-case resolution of the over-demand for each good(See Lemma 4.12). Similarly,
let RWelfarep(N) =
∑
q∈N vq(B
∗
q (p)) denote the relaxed welfare of buyers choosing their canonical
bundles at prices p; analogously, for a distribution Π over valuations, define the expected relaxed
welfare of buyers choosing canonical bundles at prices p as RWelfarep(Π) = nEv∼Π [v(B∗v(p))]. In
both cases, these quantities assume there is sufficient supply to satisfy the demand for each good.11
Before presenting the technical details, we show how the behavior induced by prices generalizes
for buyers with arbitrary valuations. Our first theorem bounds the over-demand when the Walrasian
prices computed for a market are applied to a new market.
Theorem 6.2. Fix a pricing p and two sampled markets N,N ′ of buyers with arbitrary valuations,
with |N | = |N ′| = n. Suppose e is encodable. For good g, suppose Ce(g; p;N) ≤ sg + 1. Then,
Ce(g; p;N ′)− sg = O
(√
m · sg · ln 1
δ
+m ln
1
δ
)
,
with probability 1− δ. Then, for any α ∈ (0, 45), if sg = Ω
(
m ln 1δ/α
2
)
, with probability 1− δ,
Ce(g; p;N ′) ≤ (1 + α)sg.
Our second theorem is an analagous generalization result, for welfare instead of over-demand.
Theorem 6.3. Fix two markets N,N ′ ∼ Π for which |N | = |N ′| = n. Suppose for each good g, the
prices p satisfy Ce(g; p;N) ≤ sg + 1. With probability 1− δ, if e is encodable, for any α ∈ (0, 4/5),
if p are welfare-optimal for N and
Opt-WelfareN = Ω
(
H3n0.5m4 ln2 (m) ln2 1δ
α2
)
11If the supply of each good satisfies the inequality in Theorem 6.2, then each good should have supply which can
satisfy at least an 1− α fraction of buyers who choose it. See Lemma 4.12 for a more detailed discussion.
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then
WelfareN ′(p) ≥ (1− α)Opt-WelfareN ′ .
The first result (Theorem 6.2), for over-demand, relies on bounding the VC dimension of the
class of good g’s demand indicator functions (the class contains a function for each pricing, labeling
a valuation v positive if and only if g is in the canonical bundle for v at those prices). To bound
the VC dimension, we first prove tth he class of bundle predictors (the class contains one function
for each pricing p, which maps v to v’s canonical bundles at p) is linearly separable in a space of
m+1 dimensions. Using a recent result by Daniely and Shalev-Shwartz [2014], such a class admits a
compression scheme of size m+1 and can be (, δ)-PAC learned with O
(
m
ε ln
1
δ
)
samples. Since item
predictor functions are simply projections of bundle prediction functions, their PAC-complexity of
the item predictors is an upper bounds the PAC-complexity of the bundle predictors. Since item
predictors are binary valued, we can apply the classical result of Ehrenfeucht et al. [1989] which
shows the equivalence of learning and uniform convergence for binary prediction problems, so we
can upper bound the class’s VC dimension as a function of its PAC sample complexity.
The second result (Theorem 6.3), for welfare, proceeds by bounding the pseudo-dimension of the
class of welfare predictor functions (containing, for each pricing a function which map valuations
to the value of a buyer purchasing her canonical bundle at these prices). The argument uses
the existence of a compression scheme to upper bound the number of possible distinct labelings
of valuations by bundles. Fixing a bundle labeling of a valuation also fixes the welfare of that
valuation; thus, one can upper-bound the size of a “shatterable” set and the pseudo-dimension of
the class of welfare predictors.
6.2 Learning Theory Preliminaries
This section reviews several well-known definitions from learning theory. We will show that:
• the demand of a good g from a market N at prices p should be close to the demand for g on
a new market N ′; and
• the welfare-optimal prices for N should be approximately welfare-optimal for N ′
under appropriate conditions.
Viewed from a learning-theoretic perspective, both of these statements are about the gener-
alization guarantees of a class of mechanisms. Learning theory provides many tools to formalize
how well properties of prices generalize from one market to the next. In what follows, we will first
describe standard tools for measuring the generalizability of binary-valued functions, followed by
the analogous tools for understanding the generalizability of real-valued functions. The former will
be useful in measuring the concentration of demand for a good g, while the latter will be useful for
measuring the concentration of welfare.
Suppose there is a domain V (for our purposes, the valuation functions), an unknown target
function c : V → {0, 1}, and an unknown distribution Π over V. We wish to understand how
many labeled samples (v, c(v)), with v ∼ Π, are necessary and sufficient to be able to compute a
ĉ which agrees with c almost everywhere with respect to Π. The distribution-independent sample
complexity of learning c depends fundamentally on the “complexity” of the set of binary functions
F from which we are choosing ĉ. We review two standard complexity measures next.
Let N be a set of n samples from V. The set N is said to be shattered by F if, for every
subset T ⊆ N , there is some cT ∈ F such that cT (v) = 1 if v ∈ T and cT (v′) = 0 if v′ /∈ T . That
35
is, ranging over all c ∈ F induces all 2|N | possible projections onto N . The VC dimension of F ,
denoted VC(F), is the size of the largest set S that can be shattered by F .
Let errN (ĉ) = (
∑
v∈N |c(v) − ĉ(v)|)/|N | denote the empirical error of ĉ on N , and let err(ĉ) =
Ev∼Π[|c(v)−ĉ(v)|] denote the true expected error of ĉ with respect to Π. We say that F is (, δ)-PAC
learnable with sample complexity n if there exists an algorithm A such that, for all distributions Π
and all target functions c ∈ F , when A is given a sample S of size n it produces some ĉ ∈ F such
that err(ĉ) <  with probability 1−δ over the choice of the sample. The PAC sample complexity of a
class F can be bounded as a polynomial function of VC(F), , and ln 1δ [Vapnik and Chervonenkis,
1971]; furthermore, any algorithm which (, δ)-PAC learns F over all distributions Π must use
nearly as many samples to do so. The following theorem states this well-known result formally.12
Theorem 6.4 (Hanneke [2015], Ehrenfeucht et al. [1989]). Suppose F is a class of binary functions.
Then, F can be (, δ)-PAC learned with a sample of size
n = O
(
VC(F) + ln 1δ

)
whenever c ∈ F . Furthermore, any (, δ)-PAC learning algorithm for F must have sample com-
plexity
n = Ω
(
VC(F) + ln 1δ

)
.
There is a stronger sense in which a class F can be learned, called uniform learnability. This
property implies that with a sufficiently large sample, the error of every c ∈ F on the sample is
close to the true error of c. We say F is (, δ)-uniformly learnable with sample complexity n if
for every distributions Π and a sample N of size n, |errN (c) − err(c)| <  for every c ∈ F , with
probability 1− δ. Notice that if F is (, δ)-uniformly learnable with n samples, then it is also (, δ)-
PAC learnable with n samples. We will use a well-known upper bound on the uniform sample
complexity of a class as a function of its VC dimension.
Theorem 6.5 (E.g. Vapnik and Chervonenkis [1971]). Suppose F is a class of binary functions.
Then, F can be (, δ)-uniformly learned with a sample of size
n = O
(
VC(F) ln 1 + ln 1δ
2
)
.
Both PAC learnability and uniform learnability of binary-valued functions are characterized
by the class’s VC dimension. When learning real-valued functions, for example, to guarantee
convergence of the welfare of pricings), we use a real-valued analogue to VC dimension which will
give a sufficient condition for uniform convergence, called the the pseudo-dimension [Pollard, 1984].
Formally, let c : V → [0, H] be a real-valued function over V, and F be the class we are learning
over. Let S be a sample drawn from Π, |N | = n, labeled according to c. Both the empirical and true
errors of a hypothesis ĉ are defined as before, though |ĉ(v)−c(v)| is now in the interval [0, H] rather
than in {0, 1}. Let (r1, . . . , rn) ∈ [0, H]n be a set of targets for N . We say (r1, . . . , rn) witnesses
12The upper bound stated here is a quite recent result which removes a ln 1

factor from the upper bound; a slightly
weaker but long-standing upper bound can be attributed to Vapnik and Kotz [1982].
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the shattering of N by F if, for each T ⊆ N , there exists some cT ∈ F such that cT (vq) ≥ rq for all
vq ∈ T and cT (vq) < rq for all vq /∈ T . If there exist such witnesses, we say N is shatterable by F .
The pseudo-dimension of F , denoted PD(F), is the size of the largest set S which is shatterable by
F . We will derive sample complexity upper bounds from the following theorem, which connects the
sample complexity of uniform learning over a class of real-valued functions to the pseudo-dimension
of the class.
Theorem 6.6 (E.g. Anthony and Bartlett [1999]). Let F be a class of real-valued functions with
range in [0, H] and pseudo-dimension PD(F). For every  > 0, δ ∈ [0, 1], the sample complexity of
(, δ)-uniformly learning the class F is
n = O
((
H

)2(
PD(F) ln H

+ ln
1
δ
))
.
Moreover, a conceptually simple algorithm achieves the guarantee in Theorem 6.6: simply
output the function c ∈ F with the smallest empirical error on the sample. These algorithms are
called empirical risk minimizers.
6.3 Learning from Pricings and Learning with Compression
We now introduce several other powerful tools from learning theory, recast in the language of
mechanism design. Let (v1, B1), . . . , (vn, Bn), vq ∈ V, Bq ∈ G represent samples drawn from some
distribution Π over V, labeled by bundles Bq ∈ G. For each set of prices p, the functions hp, fp
will map valuations to utility-maximizing bundles and the value the buyer of utility-maximizing
bundles, respectively. We prove bounds on the sample complexity of uniform convergence over
three classes of functions:
1) the class of functions which map valuations vq to vq(Bq) (where Bq is utility-maximizing):
HV = {fp : V → R, fp(vq) = vq(B∗), B∗ = e(Dq(p))};
2) the class of bundle predictors:
H = {hp : V → G, hp(vq) = e(Dq(p))};
3) the projection of H to its component good predictors:
Hg = {hg,p : V → {0, 1}, hp(v) = (hg,p(v))g}.
We will show that we can learn the class H using a compression scheme, a tool for proving
sample complexity bounds in the multi-label setting.
Definition 6.7. A compression scheme for F : V → X, of size d consists of
• a compression function
compress : (V ×X)n → (V ×X)d,
where compress(N) ⊆ N and d ≤ n; and
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• a decompression function
decompress : (V ×X)d → F .
For any f ∈ F and any sample (v1, f(v1)), . . . , (vn, f(vn)), the functions satisfy
decompress ◦ compress((v1, f(v1)), . . . , (vn, f(vn))) = f ′
where f ′(vq) = f(vq) for each q ∈ [n].
Intuitively, a compression function selects a subset of d most relevant points from a sample, and
based on these points, the decompression scheme selects a hypothesis. When such a scheme exists,
the learning algorithm decompress ◦ compress is an empirical risk minimizer. Furthermore, this
compression-based learning algorithm has sample complexity bounded by a function of d, which
plays a role analagous to VC dimension in the sample complexity guarantees.
Theorem 6.8 (Littlestone and Warmuth [1986]). Suppose F has a compression scheme of size d.
Then, the PAC complexity of F is at most
n = O
(
d ln 1 + ln
1
δ

)
.
While compression schemes imply useful sample complexity bounds, it can be hard to show
that a particular hypothesis class admits a compression scheme. One general technique is to show
that the class is linearly separable in a higher-dimensional space.
Definition 6.9. A class F is d-dimensionally linearly separable if there exists a function ψ :
V × G → Rd such that for any f ∈ F , there exists some wf ∈ Rd with f(v) ∈ argmaxy〈wf , ψ(v, y)〉
and |argmaxy〈wf , ψ(v, y)〉| = 1.
It is known that a d-dimensional linearly separable class admits a compression scheme of size d.
Theorem 6.10 (Daniely and Shalev-Shwartz [2014]). Suppose F has a d-dimensional realizable
linear separator ψ. Then, there exists a compression scheme for F of size d.
6.4 Over-Demand Concentration
In this section, we outline the proof of over-demand concentration (Theorem 6.2). The proof
proceeds in two steps. First, we bound the VC dimension of the class of good predictors Hg by
O(m) (Theorem 6.11). For arbitrary valuations, the argument first shows that the class of bundle
predictors H is (m+1)-linearly separable and is thus PAC learnable with a sample size proportional
to m. Since hg,p ∈ Hg is a projection of h ∈ H, Hg must also be PAC learnable with the same
number of samples. Since functions in Hg are binary classifiers and PAC learning is completely
characterized by VC dimension in the binary setting, we can bound the VC dimension of Hg.
Then, since Hg has small VC dimension, it is possible to bound the maximum difference between
the sampled demand on N and the new demand on N ′ for any hg,p ∈ Hg by O˜
(
VC(Hg) · √sg
)
(Theorem 6.13, whose proof follows standard arguments for bounding PAC sample complexity,
using Bernstein’s inequality in place of Hoeffding’s inequality to achieve an upper bound on error
which scales as
√
sg rather than
√
n).
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Theorem 6.11. The VC dimension of Hg is at most O (m)if the tie-breaking rule e is encodable.
The proof of Theorem 6.11 relies on the following lemma about the linear separability of the
class.
Lemma 6.12. H is (m+ 1)-linearly separable, if the tie-breaking rule e is encodable.
of Theorem 6.11. Lemma 6.12 states that H, the class which predicts bundles, is (m+ 1)-linearly
separable. Then, Theorem 6.10 implies that there exists a compression scheme of size m+ 1 for H.
Thus, one can PAC-learn H with at most n = O
(
m ln 1

+ln 1
δ

)
samples, by Theorem 6.8. Since Hg is
a projection of H onto its the gth coordinate, PAC-learning Hg cannot require more samples than
PAC-learning H, so this sample complexity bound on n also applies to Hg. Then, Theorem 6.4
implies that the VC dimension of the binary class Hg satisfies
c ·
(
m+ ln 1δ

)
≥ V C(Hg) + ln
1
δ

for some constant c. The claim follows by basic algebra.
We briefly sketch the proof of Lemma 6.12 (the full proof can be found in Appendix F.1).
In order to show H is (m + 1)-linearly separable, we must define two things. First, we define a
mapping Ψ : V × G → Rm+1 where Ψ(v,B)g encodes whether or not g ∈ B for each good g ∈ [m],
and Ψ(v,B)m+1 = v(B) encodes the buyer’s value for a bundle B. Second, we define a weight
vector wp ∈ Rm+1 for each price vector p where wpg = −pg encodes the cost of good g ∈ [m] at
these prices, while wpm+1 = 1. Accordingly, the dot product of Ψ(v,B) and w
p encodes the utility
of a buyer v buying a bundle B at prices p: Ψ(v,B) ·wp = v(B)−p(B). Thus, a utility-maximizing
bundle B∗ maximizes the dot product B∗ ∈ argmaxBΨ(v,B) · wp.
Unfortunately, there are two obstacles with this plan of attack. First, the statement of Theo-
rem 6.10 assumes that the maximum is unique—if not, prediction is not even well-defined. Second,
in order to obtain welfare guarantees, we need some assumptions on how ties are broken, namely,
that a buyer buys her canonical bundle. To solve both problems simultaneously, we describe how
to perturb Ψ and wp to ensure that the argmax is unique, and that B∗ = argmaxB(Ψ(v,B) ·wp) =
e(argmaxBv(B)− p(B)); namely, that ties are broken appropriately by the linear mapping Ψ.
The second ingredient in proving the demand for good g on N is close to N ′ is the following
theorem, which states that the empirical average of `(f, ·) on a sample N should be close to the
expectation of ` on the distribution Π for all functions f ∈ F , for any function ` : F × (V,G) →
{0, 1}.
Theorem 6.13. Consider a hypothesis class F , and `(f, x) ∈ {0, 1}. Let N ∼ Π be a sample such
that |N | = n. Then, with probability 1− δ, for all f ∈ F ,
`Π(f)− `N (f) ≤
√
2VC(F)`N (f) ln 1δ
n
+
VC(F) ln 1δ
n
≤ 3VC(F) ln
1
δ
√
`N (f)√
n
.
The bound on the distance depends on the size of the sample N as well as the VC dimension
of the class F . The proof of this theorem and the formal proof of Theorem 6.2 can be found in
the appendix; the argument follows straightforwardly from Shalev-Shwartz and Ben-David [2014]
(specifically, Theorem 6.11 replacing the bound on the difference in losses for a fixed hypothesis by
the bound in Lemma B.10).
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6.5 Welfare Concentration
Somewhat unusually, our proof of Theorem 6.2 did not go through a combinatorial shattering
argument to prove a bound on VC dimension. In contrast, our proof that the welfare of Wal-
rasian prices generalizes (Theorem 6.3) relies on an explicit shattering argument. First, we bound
the pseudo-dimension of the class of welfare predictors HV (Theorem 6.14). This follows from a
combinatorial shattering argument using the linear separator for H. Then, we show that classes
with small pseudo-dimension yield strong concentration (Theorem F.7). Similar to the results
for over-demand, the latter statement follows from a standard sample complexity argument using
Bernstein’s inequality in place of Hoeffding’s inequality to get a multiplicative bound. We then
show that optimal welfare is well-concentrated (Lemma 6.16). Thus, if the welfare on N ′ for prices
p is close to the optimal welfare for N , then the welfare of N ′ at p must be nearly optimal for N ′.
We begin by proving a bound on the pseudo-dimension of the welfare predictors HV .
Theorem 6.14. The pseudo-dimension of HV is O
(
m2 lnm
)
for general valuations V and
O
(
m ln3m
)
for unit demand valuations, if e is encodable.
The proof of Theorem 6.14 (see Appendix F.3) relies on the following combinatorial lemma.
Lemma 6.15. H can induce at most ( nm+1) ·2m(m+1) bundle labelings of n sampled valuations, and
at most
(
n
m+1
) ·mm+1 for unit demand buyers, if e is encodable.
Proof. Let hp(N) = (hp(v1), . . . , hp(vn)) (by abuse of notation) represent the labeling of a sample
N by hp. Lemma 6.12 shows that H is (m + 1)-linearly separable. By Theorem 6.10, there exists
a (m + 1)-sized compression scheme Ψ for learning the class H. Thus, there exists a pair of
functions (decompress, compress) such that for any price vector p, there exists Np ⊆ N with
|Np| = m + 1 such that (i) compress(hp(N)) = hp(Np), (ii) decompress(compress(hp(N))) =
decompress(hp(Np)) = f , and and f(vq) = Bq = hp(vq) for every vq ∈ N .
We will bound the number of distinct labelings H can induce on a sample N = (v1, . . . , vn)
of size n. To do so, we the decompression function (which depends only on the separator Ψ) to
upper-bound the total number of labelings H can induce on S.
Our approach will be to upper bound the size of the range of decompress ◦ compress when
restricted to subsamples of a particular population N by some quantity D. By definition of a
compression scheme, for every labeling of buyers in N by bundles that can be induced by some
price vector, there is an element of the range of decompress◦compress that recovers that labeling
on N . So, we can upper bound the total number of distinct labelings that can be induced on N
by price vectors by upper bounding the range of decompress ◦ compress on N . The idea is that
each compression is defined by a subset N ′ of at most m+ 1 of the buyers in N , and a labeling of
the buyers with bundles. So, bounding the number of such labeled subsets suffices to bound the
range of decompress ◦ compress.
We prove such a bound for D =
(
n
m+1
)·(2m)m+1. Fix any subset of unlabeled examples N ′ ⊆ N ,
where |N ′| = m+ 1. For any x ∈ N ′, there are at most 2m labelings of x from G. Thus, there are
at most (2m)m+1 = 2m(m+1) labelings of all of N ′ from G.13 Thus, decompress ◦ compress can
output at most
(
n
m+1
) · 2m(m+1) distinct functions based on labeled subsets of N .
13If buyers are unit demand, we have a sharper bound: there are at most m labelings per x ∈ N ′, or mm+1 labelings
in total.
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Theorem 6.14, along with known results for uniform convergence over classes with small pseudo-
dimension, implies that the welfare of any set of prices p on a sufficiently large sample is very close
to the welfare p induces on a fresh sample of the same size. The next lemma shows that the optimal
welfare allocation on the training and test samples have very similar welfare, since the optimal
welfare is a well-concentrated quantity.
Lemma 6.16. Recall that Opt-WelfareN denotes the optimal welfare achievable by an allocation
of a fixed set of goods in a market to buyers with valuations N = (v1, . . . , vn) bounded in [0, H].
Then, the optimal welfare on two samples N,N ′ of size n drawn i.i.d. from distribution Π satisfies
Pr[|Opt-WelfareN −Opt-WelfareN ′ | ≥ 4] ≤ exp
(
− 2
2
nH2
)
for all  ∈ (0, 1). In particular, |Opt-WelfareN − Opt-WelfareN ′ | ≤ H
√
n ln 1δ with probability at
least 1− δ.
The proof of Lemma 6.16 uses McDiarmid’s inequality, and can be found in Appendix F.4. We
now prove the main result of this section, which guarantees first that for any p, the welfare induced
on N is similar to the welfare induced on N ′. In particular, if p is the welfare-optimal pricing for
N , then it is also nearly welfare-optimal for N ′.
of Theorem 6.3. We wish to show that with probability 1− δ,
Opt-WelfareN ′ −WelfareN ′(p) ≤ αOpt-WelfareN ′ .
We begin by noting that
Opt-WelfareN ′ −WelfareN ′(p)
≤ Opt-WelfareN −WelfareN ′(p) +H
√
n ln
1
δ
(Lemma 6.16)
≤WelfareN (p) + 2mH −WelfareN ′(p) +
√
nH ln
1
δ
(Theorem 5.27)
≤ RWelfareN (p) + 3mH −WelfareN ′(p) +H
√
n ln
1
δ
(Theorem 5.26 and Lemma 4.12)
≤ RWelfareN (p)− RWelfareN ′(p) +mH
(
max
g
√
sgm ln
1
δ
+m ln
1
δ
)
+H
√
n ln
1
δ
+ 3mH
≤ RWelfareN (p)− RWelfareN ′(p) +mH
(√
nm ln
1
δ
+m ln
1
δ
)
+H
√
n ln
1
δ
+ 3mH (7)
where the second to last step follows by Theorem 6.2 and Lemma 4.12, and the last step by sg ≤ n,
otherwise, we can replace sg by n in the bound in Theorem 6.2, since C
e(N ; p; g) ≤ n+ 1.
Applying Theorem F.7 to
∑
q∈N vq(B
∗
q (p)) = n ·
∑
q∈N vq(B∗q (p))
n and the analagous term for N
′,
we know that for all pricings p,
RWelfareN (p)− RWelfareN ′(p) ≤
(
H3/2PD(F) ln 1
δ
)(
1
3
+
√
19RWelfareN (p)
)
.
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Using Theorem 6.14, this reduces to
RWelfareN (p)− RWelfareN ′(p)
≤
(
H3/2m2 lnm ln
1
δ
)(
1
3
+
√
19RWelfareN (p)
)
(Theorem 6.14’s bound on PD(HV))
≤
(
H3/2m2 lnm ln
1
δ
)(
2
√
19RWelfareN (p)
)
≤
(
H3/2m2 lnm ln
1
δ
)(
2
√
19WelfareN (p) +mH
)
(Theorem 5.26 and Lemma 4.12)
≤
(
H3/2m2 lnm ln
1
δ
)(
2
√
19Opt-WelfareN +mH
)
(WelfareN (p) is feasible)
≤
(
H3/2m2 lnm ln
1
δ
)2
√
19Opt-WelfareN ′ +H
√
n ln
1
δ
+mH
 . (Lemma 6.16)
Combining with Eq. (7), we have
Opt-WelfareN ′ −WelfareN ′(p) ≤
(
H3/2m2 lnm ln
1
δ
)2
√
19Opt-WelfareN ′ +H
√
n ln
1
δ
+mH

+mH
(√
nm ln
1
δ
+m ln
1
δ
)
+H
√
n ln
1
δ
+ 3mH.
If we wish for this to be at most αOpt-WelfareN ′ , it suffices for
Opt-WelfareN ′ = Ω
(
H3n0.5m4 ln2 (m) ln2 1δ
α2
)
.
With probability 1−δ, we know that Opt-WelfareN−Opt-WelfareN ′ ≤ H
√
n ln 1δ , so this is satisfied
by Opt-WelfareN ′ whenever it is satisfied by Opt-WelfareN with probability 1− δ, which holds by
assumption.
sketch of Theorem 4.15. This proof follows the identical calculation from Theorem 6.3, replacing
the bound on pseudo-dimension by m ln3m, as is implied by Theorem 6.14 when buyers are unit
demand.
Finally, we sketch the proof of Theorem 6.3. The optimal welfare for the two markets must be
close, by Lemma 6.16. The welfare of the pricing p output for the first market is nearly optimal
even when over-demand is resolved adversarially, since there is over-demand of at most 1 for each
good by assumption. By Theorem 6.14, the pseudo-dimension of the class is at most m2 ln2m for
general valuations and at most m ln3m for unit-demand valuations. A pseudo-dimension analogue
of Theorem 6.13 implies that the welfare of applying p to the second market will be close to the
welfare of applying p to the initial market.
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6.6 Lower bounds for learning
We now show that the VC dimension of Hg, the class of bundle predictors for a fixed good g (at a
pricing p) is at least m, implying our bound on the VC dimension of Hg from the previous section
is tight up to constant factors.
Theorem 6.17. Let V be the set of unit demand valuations. Then VC(Hg) ≥ m and PD(HV ) ≥
m, for Hg,HV over valuations V.
Proof. Fix a particular good g. We will show a set N = (v1, . . . vn) of unit demand buyer valuations
which can be shattered by both Hg and HV . Suppose n = m and label buyers such that q ∈ N also
corresponds to some q ∈ [m]. Then, for all q 6= g, define vq({q}) = 2, vq({g}) = 1, and vq({g′}) = 0
for all goods g′ /∈ {q, g}. Let vg({g} = 12 and vg({g′}) = 0. The intuition for this construction is
that buyer q will buy good g if the price of their “individual” good q is sufficiently larger than the
price of g (pq > pg + 1), and buyer g will buy good g if the price is less than her value (pg ≤ vg).
Consider an arbitrary set N ′ ⊆ N . We will first show that Hg can label N ′ positive and N \ N ′
negative. We define prices p as follows.
If g ∈ N ′, then let pg = 0 and pg′ = 1 + 2 if g′ ∈ N ′ and pg′ =  if g′ /∈ N ′. Then, for buyer g,
vg({g}) = 12 > pg = 0, and vg({g′}) = 0 < pg′ for all other g′; thus, {g} is the unique bundle in Dg(p)
(and so hg,p(vg) = 1). Then, for g
′ ∈ N ′, vg′(g′)−pg′ = 2−(1+2) < 1 = vg′(g)−pg, thus {g} is the
unique bundle in Dg′(p) (so, hg,p(vg′) = 1). For any g′ /∈ N ′, vg′({g′}−pg′ = 2− > 1 = vg′({g})−pg;
thus, {g′} is the unique bundle in Dg′(p) and so hg,p(vg′) = 0.
If, on the other hand, g /∈ N ′, let pg = 12 + , pg′ = 32 + 2 if g′ ∈ N ′ and pg′ =  if g′ /∈ N ′.
Then, since vg({g}) = 12 < 12 +  = pg, hg,p(vg) = 0. For g′ ∈ N ′, vg′({g}) − pg = 1 − 12 −  >
2 − 32 − 2 = vg′({g′}) − pg′ , thus {g} is the unique bundle in Dg′(p) and so hg,p(vg′) = 1. For
g′ /∈ N ′, vg′({g})− pg = 1− 12 −  < 2−  = vg′({g′})− pg′ , so {g′} is the unique bundle in Dg′(p),
and so hg,p(vg′) = 0.
Thus, for arbitrary N ′ ⊆ N , we can choose prices p such that hg,p(v) = 1 if and only if v ∈ N ′,
so we have shown how to shatter N with Hg.
The same N is shatterable by HV , as we now argue. Consider (r1, . . . , rn) a set of targets, with
rg =
1
2 and rg′ =
3
2 for all g
′ 6= g. Thus, the target is hit for vg only when buyer g buys good g (and
for vg′ when buyer g
′ buys good g′). For a set of buyers N ′ ⊆ N , set the prices p as above for Hg,
but swap the definition of pg′ for g
′ ∈ N ′ with that of pg′ for g′ /∈ N ′. In the previous definition of
p, whenever g′ ∈ N ′, buyer g′ bought g and not g′, and when g′ /∈ N ′ buyer g′ bought g′ and not g.
So, when these are swapped, g′ will buy g′ if and only if g′ ∈ N ′ (thus, hitting the welfare target of
rg′ if and only if g
′ ∈ N ′). For buyer g, when g ∈ N ′, the prices above cause buyer g to buy good
g, hitting welfare target rg (and, when g /∈ N ′, g didn’t buy g, therefore missing welfare target rg).
Thus, for this modified definition of p, all buyers q ∈ N ′ will have fp(vq) ≥ rq and for all q /∈ N ′,
fp(vq) < rq. Thus, we can shatter N according to these targets.
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A Valuations over bundles of copies versus bundles of goods
We make clear in this section that although the market that buyers face includes the copies sg of
goods g ∈ [m], we can instead focus on valuations defined on the market of just the goods [m] when
buyers demand at most one copy of each good. We closely follow the work of Shioura and Tamura
[2015] to work with multiple copy valuation functions, which are functions on integer lattice points.
We define the set of all allocations in the multiple copy market (where each good g ∈ [m] has sg
many copies) as
X = {0, 1, , · · · , s1} × · · · × {0, 1, · · · , sm}.
Thus each buyer q ∈ N has a valuation vq : X → [0, H]. As we do in the main body of the paper,
we assume that the valuations are monotone. We will denote ~x ∈ X where
~x = (~x(g) : g ∈ [m]).
Note that buyers demand at most one copy of each good, so we define the projection pi : X → {0, 1}m
as
pi(~x) = (min{~x(1), 1},min{~x(2), 1}, · · · ,min{~x(m), 1})
The set of valuations we consider can be written as
V X = {v : X → [0, H] : v(~x) = v(pi(~x))}.
We now define the demand correspondence DX(p; vq) and Walrasian equilibrium in this setting
where buyers have valuations vq ∈ V X for each q ∈ N .
Definition A.1 (Demand Correspondence). Let buyer q have valuation vq : X → [0, H]. We then
define the demand correspondence for any price p as
DX(p; vq) = argmax
~x∈X
{vq(~x)− pT~x}.
Definition A.2 (WE-X). A Walrasian Equilibrium for buyers with valuations vq : X → [0, H] is
a tuple (p, (~xq : q ∈ N)) where
• ~xq ∈ DX(p; vq)
• ∑q∈N ~xq(g) ≤ sg for any g ∈ [m], and if the inequality is strict, then the price for that good
is zero.
We will write χS ∈ {0, 1}m as the characteristic vector of S ⊆ [m]. Note that if (p, µ) is a
WE as we defined in Footnote 6, then when we write the characteristic function ~xq = χµq for each
q ∈ N we will have (p, (~xq : q ∈ N)) is a WE-X as we defined above. Thus, we only need to focus
on valuations defined over the boolean cube {0, 1}m or equivalently over the subsets of [m].
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B Non-minimal Walrasian prices and genericity
We show here that even in a market that contains only generic unit demand buyers, the over-
demand at a non-minimal Walrasian price vector can be high. This is in contrast to our result in
Theorem 4.10, in which we showed that the over-demand can be at most 1 at minimal Walrasian
prices when buyers have generic valuations.
Lemma B.1. There exists generic valuations such that the over-demand maxg∈[m]ODp(g, µ) =
n− 1 for some Walrasian equilibrium (p, µ) where p is not minimal.
Proof. We consider a slight variant of valuations given in the proof of Lemma 3.1. Consider n unit
demand agents N = [n] with generic valuations and good types [n] where each type has a single
copy. We assume that each buyer q’s generic valuation satisfies the following for some special good
g ∈ [m]
vq(h) < vq(g) < vq(q) ∀h 6= q, g
Consider the prices pq = vq(q) − vq(g) for q ∈ [n]. This price vector still satisfies the maximum
allocation where every buyer q gets good q, but it now has every buyer q have an indifference
between good g and q. Hence, the over-demand for good g at these prices is n− 1. We know that
p is not minimal due to Theorem 4.10.
C Minimal demand bundles form a matroid basis
To establish this fact (Lemma 5.3), we look to Ben-Zwi et al. [2013]. They prove essentially the
same lemma, but only when valuations are rational numbers. Since we require genericity, it may
not be reasonable to also assume that valuations are rational. Fortunately, it is straightforward to
modify the proof by Ben-Zwi et al. [2013] for the general case, which we do here. We begin by
showing the following claim which will help in our analysis.
Claim C.1. If B,B′ ∈ D∗(p) then |B| = |B′|.
Proof. Let D1, D2 ∈ D∗(p). Let p′ = p, except p′(g) = ∞ for g /∈ D1 ∪ D2. Note that D1, D2 ∈
D∗(p′). We define a small quantity  as
 = min
B,B′⊆[m]
|B\B′|,|B′\B|≤1
{
u(B; p)− u(B′; p) : u(B; p)− u(B′; p) > 0} .
Let g2 ∈ D2 \ D1 and define p′2 = p′ except p′2(g2) = p′(g2) + . We then know that D2 /∈ D(p′2)
because u(D1; p
′
2) = u(D1; p
′) = u(D2; p′) > u(D2; p′2). Due to the single improvement property
of GS valuations, we know that there exists D3 such that both |D3 \ D2|, |D2 \ D3| ≤ 1 and
u(D3; p
′
2) > u(D2; p
′
2). We then have
u(D3; p
′
2) > u(D2; p
′
2) =⇒ u(D3; p)− 1{g2 ∈ D3} > u(D2; p)− 
=⇒ − 1{g2 ∈ D3} > u(D2; p)− u(D3; p). (8)
We know that D2 ∈ D(p) so that u(D2; p)− u(D3; p) ≥ 0, which tells us that g2 /∈ D3. Further, we
know that if u(D2; p) − u(D3; p) > 0 then u(D2; p) − u(D3; p) ≥ . However, Eq. (8) tells us that
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u(D2; p) − u(D3; p) < , thus a contradiction. We then have u(D3; p) = u(D2; p). Hence, we have
shown that g2 ∈ D3, D3 ∈ D(p) and D3 is not contained in D2.
Thus, ∃g1 /∈ D2 such that g1 ∈ D3 ⊆ D1∪D2 which implies that g1 ∈ D1\D2. Thus, we can say
that D3 = D2 ∪ g1 \ g2. We continue with induction on |D2 \D1| to conclude that |D2| = |D1|.
Proof of Lemma 5.3. We now let D̂(p) = {S ∈ D(p) : |S| ≤ |T |, ∀T ∈ D(p)}, which we know forms
the bases of some matroid from Gul and Stacchetti [2000]. We first show that D∗(p) ⊆ D̂(p).
If D ∈ D∗(p) then we know that |D| = |D∗| for all D∗ ∈ D∗(p) by the previous claim. Hence,
|D| ≤ |B| for all B ∈ D(p), i.e. D ∈ D̂(p).
We now show that D̂(p) ⊆ D∗(p). Assume that D ∈ D̂(p), but D /∈ D∗(p). We then know that
there exists a D∗ ( D where D∗ ∈ D∗(p). This must mean that |D∗| < |D|, but this contradicts
the fact that D ∈ D̂(p), i.e. |D| ≤ |B| for every B ∈ D(p). Thus, we have a contradiction, so that
D ∈ D∗(p). Further, we have shown that D∗(p) = D̂(p).
D Constructing genericity via perturbation
When working with matchings (Section 4), we assumed that valuations are generic in the sense of
Definition 4.4. Instead, we can imagine perturbing the valuations slightly to achieving genericity.
While “any” continuous perturbation should achieve genericity, we can also give a more concrete
perturbation procedure. While it is difficult to guarantee a definition like Definition 4.4, we can
limit over-demand using a relaxed version of genericity.
Let’s suppose that bidders start with valuations vi(j) (possibly non-generic) and minimal Wal-
rasian prices p. Each bidder will perturb their valuation by selecting a uniformly random element
of P ⊆ R, a (finite) set of perturbations. We will continue to assume that the maximum match-
ing µ is unique. We will write ∆ for the smallest positive difference social welfare between two
allocations—possibly not allocating all goods, or infeasible For instance, this assumption holds in
the typical case where all valuations are given with finite precision, when we can treat all valuations
as integer multiples of ∆.
Our goal is to show that with high probability, the perturbed values v̂i(j) and corresponding
minimal prices p̂ have limited over-demand when bidders select an arbitrary most-demanded good.
Our analysis will begin with the original valuations vi(j) and prices p. As we have done throughout,
we consider the swap graph. By identical reasoning as before, the graph is acyclic and the nodes
can be partially ordered. We will consider the nodes according to this order, using the principle of
deferred decision to successively perturb the valuations. As we go, we will construct a modified set
of prices p̂′ that guarantees each good is over-demanded by at most 1. Finally, we will argue that
p̂′ is indeed the minimal Walrasian prices for v̂i(j), tying the knot.
Let the goods be numbered 1, . . . , k according to the partial order in the original swap graph
G; for convenience, we will also label bidders with the same index according to their matched good
in the original matching µ. We will construct the modified prices p̂′ inductively. We begin by
setting p̂1 = 0, and sampling bidder 1’s perturbation for good 1 but leaving the other perturbations
unsampled, by the principle of deferred decisions.
For the inductive case, we have prices p̂ for goods in [j] and sampled bidder valuations by
bidders in [j] for goods in [j]. To set the price of good j + 1, we first have bidder j + 1 sample
valuations for all goods in [j + 1]. Now, we need to specify the valuations of bidders in [j] for the
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new good j + 1. We consider a set of candidate price functions r1, . . . , rj , where
rl(v) := v − v̂l(l) +
∑
(a,b)∈C
v̂a(b)− v̂a(a)
and C is a directed path from a source to l in Ĝ (recall that Ĝ is acyclic). Roughly, rl maps the
valuation of bidder l for j + 1 to a price for l at which bidder l becomes indifferent between l and
j + 1. Note that by induction, l ∈ [j] and we have already fixed all v̂ when defining rl. We now
sample ̂vl(j + 1) for l ∈ [j], and define
p′j+1 := max
l
(0, rl( ̂vl(j + 1))).
That is, if all rl are negative, we define p
′
j+1 := 0.
The key point is that in the new swap graph Ĝ, there is an edge from l to j + 1 exactly when
l is binding (i.e., in the argmax) in the definition of p′j+1. Since rl(v) is a linear function, if the
number of possible perturbations |P| is large enough, we will be unlikely to have a collision. In
other words, with high probability the in-degree of j + 1 will either be 1, or zero with price 0.
First, we show that the new swap graph Ĝ is a subgraph of the old swap graph Ĝ, and that the
prices p′ are close to p.
Lemma D.1. For each good j, the following two statements hold:
1. If C is a path in Ĝ ending at j, then C is also a path in G.
2. Suppose that all perturbations in P are bounded by ∆/2k. Then, |p′j − pj | < ∆j/k for each
good j.
Proof. We prove both points simultaneously by induction on j. The base case j = 1 is clear: the
good 1 is a source node in both graphs, and has price 0.
For the inductive case, we prove the first point first. If j is a source node in Ĝ then the first
point is trivial. Otherwise, there is a path C ending at j in Ĝ. Suppose the node before j in C is
l. By induction, the segment of C ending at l is a path in G. So, we just need to show that there
is an edge (l, j) in G.
By construction of p′, we know
p′j = v̂l(j)− v̂l(l) + p′l ≥ 0.
If there is no edge (l, j), then
(vl(l)− pl)− (vl(j) + pj) > 0
We can write the price as a sum of differences of valuations (Lemma 4.8), and collecting the positive
and negative parts, the above equation shows that the difference in welfare of two (possibly partial)
allocations is non-negative. By assumption, the difference is at least ∆ > 0, and hence
(vl(l)− pl)− (vl(j) + pj) > ∆ so vl(j)− vl(l) + pl < −∆− pj ≤ −∆.
This is a contradiction: by induction, |p′l − pl| ≤ ∆l/k, and vl(l), vj(l) differ from v̂l(l), v̂l(j) by at
most ∆/2k at most, and l ≤ j − 1 ≤ k − 1.
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Now, for the second point. Suppose that j is a source node in Ĝ. So, p′j = 0. Suppose that
there is a non-empty path C from a source node to j in G (if not, then pj = p
′
j = 0), and suppose
C hits l before landing at j, so
pj = vl(j)− vl(l) + pl.
By induction, we know |p′l − pl| < ∆l/k. Furthermore, we know
rl(v̂l(j)) := v̂l(j)− v̂l(l) + p′l < 0.
Since v̂l(j) and v̂l(l) are at most ∆/2k away from vl(j) and vl(l) respectively, we know pj ≤
∆/2k + ∆/2k + ∆l/k ≤ ∆j/k by induction, and since l ≤ j − 1.
Otherwise, j is not a source node in Ĝ. Suppose that C is the shortest path from a source node
to j in Ĝ, with l the node before j in C. We have:
p′j = rl(v̂l(j)) = v̂l(j)− v̂l(l) + p′l.
We know that C is also a path from a source node to j in G, so
pj = vl(j)− vl(l) + pl.
The claim follows by induction.
Finally, we can show that p′ is indeed the minimal Walrasian prices for the perturbed valuations.
Lemma D.2. Suppose that all perturbations in P are bounded by ∆/2k. The prices p′ are minimal
Walrasian prices for valuations v̂.
Proof. The new prices p′ support µ, a feasible allocation. Consider any other feasible allocation µ′.
We have changed each bidder’s valuation by at most ∆/2k, so the welfare of µ and µ′ each change
by at most ∆/2 in the new market. Since the original difference in social welfare between µ and µ′
is at least ∆, µ must remain the maximum matching in the perturbed market.
The only thing we need to check is that nodes with in-degree 0 (i.e., goods that are not over-
demanded) have price 0. But this is also clear, from the construction of p′.
Like before, we can bound the worst-case over-demand by the in-degree of any node in Ĝ.
Theorem D.3. Suppose that all perturbations in P are bounded by ∆/2k. If |P| = Ω(n2k/β), then
with probability at least 1− β, each node in Ĝ has in-degree at most 1.
Proof. Note that setting prices for good j can only add edges to j, and leaves the rest of the swap
graph Ĝ unchanged. So, consider a single good j, and consider any pair of bidders (r, s). Fixing
v̂r(j), there is at most one value of v̂s(j) that collides (possibly leading to two arcs into j), so the
probability of any pair colliding is 1/|P|. Taking a union bound over the O(n2) pairs and k goods,
the collision probability in the two graph Ĝ is at most O(n2k/|P|) = O(β).
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E Proof of Lemma 4.12
Proof of Lemma 4.12. We first prove the first condition. We know by assumption that |{q : g ∈
Bq}| ≤ sg + d (at most sg + d buyers have g in their bundle). Let qg be the label of the (sg + 1)st
(according to the ordering σ) buyer with g in their bundle, i.e. g ∈ Bqg and∑
q′:σ(q′)<σ(qg)
1{g ∈ Bq′} = sg.
Then, let Sg = {q : g ∈ Bq and σ(q) ≥ σ(qg)} be the set of buyers whose bundle contains g and
who, according to the ordering σ, are after the sgth buyer with g ∈ Bq. For each such buyer q let
B̂q = ∅. Otherwise, let B̂q = Bq. Then,
RWelfareN (B1, . . . , Bn) =
∑
q
vq(Bq) =
∑
q /∈⋃g Sg
vq(Bq) +
∑
q∈⋃g Sg
vq(Bq)
=
∑
q /∈⋃g Sg
vq(B̂q) +
∑
q∈⋃g Sg
vq(Bq) ≤
∑
q /∈⋃g Sg
vq(B̂q) +
∑
g
∑
q∈Sg
vq(Bq)
≤
∑
q /∈⋃g Sg
vq(B̂q) +
∑
g
∑
q∈Sg
H ≤
∑
q /∈⋃g Sg
vq(B̂q) + d ·m ·H
≤
∑
q
vq(B̂q) + d ·m ·H = RWelfareN (B̂1, . . . , B̂n) + d ·m ·H
where the third equality follows from the definition of B̂q, the first inequality from the fact that
q ∈ ∪gSg implies q ∈ Sg for some g, the second inequality from the bound on all the valuations, the
third inequality from the assumption on |Sg| ≤ d and there being m goods, and the last inequality
from the definition of B̂q.
We now prove the second statement. Let Ng be the set of sampled bidders for that demand g,
and consider a fixed buyer q. For each good g ∈ Bq, let pg = PNg [q ∈ Ng] ≥ sgsg+d and p = ming pg.
We will now prove, for an arbitrary partition (D1, D2) of Bq, that
E
N1,...,Nm
[
vq(B̂q \D2)
]
≥ p · vq(Bq \D2).
Our claim follows when D2 = ∅ after summing over all buyers q.
We proceed by induction on |D1|. If |D1| = 0, then D2 = Bq and Bq \D2 = B̂q \D2 = ∅, so
E
N1,...,Nm
[
vq(B̂q \D2)
]
= 0 = p · 0 = p · vq(∅).
Now, assume for all partitions (D′1, D′2) of Bq with |D′1| < t, we have
E
N1,...,Nm
[
vq(B̂q \D′2)
]
≥ p · vq(Bq \D′2).
We wish to show that for a partition (D1, D2) of Bq with |D1| = t ≥ 1, we have
E
N1,...,Nm
[
vq(B̂q \D2)
]
≥ p · vq(Bq \D2).
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For notational cleanliness, let R be the random variable B̂q \D2. For any good g ∈ Bq \D2 and
bidder q, we have
E
N1,...,Nm
[vq(R)] = P [q ∈ Ng] · E [vq(R) | q ∈ Ng] + P [q /∈ Ng] · E [vq(R) | q /∈ Ng]
= pg · E [vq(R) | g ∈ R] + (1− pg) · E [vq(R) | g /∈ R]
= pg · E [vq(R) | g ∈ R] + (1− pg) · E [vq(R \ {g})]
= pg · E [vq(R \ {g} ∪ {g})] + (1− pg) · E [vq(R \ {g})]
= pg · E [vq(R \ {g}) + (vq(R \ {g} ∪ {g})− vq(R \ {g}))] + (1− pg) · E [vq(R \ {g})]
= pg · E [(vq(R \ {g} ∪ {g})− vq(R \ {g}))] + E [vq(R \ {g})]
≥ pg · E [(vq(D1 \ {g} ∪ {g})− vq(D1 \ {g}))] + E [vq(R) \ {g})]
= pg · E [(vq(D1)− vq(D1 \ {g}))] + E [vq(R \ {g})]
= pg · (vq(D1)− vq(D1 \ {g})) + E [vq(R \ {g})]
= pg · (vq(D1)− vq(D1 \ {g})) + E
[
vq(B̂q \D2 \ {g})
]
= pg · (vq(D1)− vq(D1 \ {g})) + E
[
vq(B̂q \ (D2 ∪ {g}))
]
≥ pg · (vq(D1)− vq(D1 \ {g})) + p · vq(Bq \ (D2 ∪ {g}))
= pg · (vq(D1)− vq(D1 \ {g})) + p · vq(D1 \ {g}))
≥ p · ((vq(D1)− vq(D1 \ {g})) + vq(D1 \ {g}))
= p · vq(D1) = p · vq(Bq \D2)
where the first inequality follows from the subadditivity of vq and R = B̂q \D2 ⊆ Bq \D2 = D1;
the following equality follows from g ∈ D1 = Bq \ D2; the second to last inequality follows from
our inductive hypothesis (since g ∈ B1 \D2, and (D1 \ {g}, D2 ∪ {g}) form a partition satisfying
the induction criterion); the final inequality follows from p ≤ pg for all g.
F Omitted Learning Proofs
F.1 Proof of Lemma 6.12
The high-level idea for the proof of Lemma 6.12 is as follows. In order to show H is m+ 1-linearly
separable, we must define two things. First, we need a mapping Ψ : V × G → Rm+1 , where
Ψ(v,B)g will encode whether or not g ∈ B for each good g ∈ [m], and Ψ(v,B)m+1 = v(B) encodes
the agent’s value for a bundle B), and (2), for each price vector p a weight vector wp ∈ Rm+1 where
wpg = −pg encodes the cost of good g ∈ [m] at these prices, while wpm+1 = 1. These will have the
property that their dot product encodes the utility of an agent v buying a bundle B at prices p:
that is, Ψ(v,B) ·wp = v(B)− p(B). Thus, as desired, a utility-maximizing bundle B∗ will have the
property that B∗ ∈ argmaxBΨ(v,B) · wp.
Unfortunately, two related problems remain with this formulation. First, the statement of
Theorem 6.10 assumes this argmax is unique.14 Second, we want to assume that amongst the
demanded bundles, agents with valuation vq break ties according to the encodable tie-breaking rule
14If the argmax is not unique, prediction is not even well defined.
53
e = (Lvq , y). Fortunately, we can slightly perturb Ψ and the set of w
ps such that they encode the
tie-breaking rule e, causing e(Dq(p)) to be the unique bundle which maximizes Ψ(v,B) · wp over
B, solving both problems at once. It will be useful to have notation for the set of bundles which
maximize the dot product between these quantities, so we define M(v, p) = argmaxBΨ̂(v,B) · ŵp.
We now define the perturbed versions of Ψ and wp. Recall that y ∈ Rm, so yg will refer to the
gth coordinate of this vector. Let
α = min
{
1, min
t,B,B′: vt(B)−vt(B′)6=0
|vt(B)− vt(B′)|
}
be the smallest gap between any valuation’s distinct values for two bundles on the sample, or 1 if
the gap is above 1.15 Then, let y′g =
yg ·α
4m·maxg′ yg′ . Then, we define
ŵpg =
{
−pg + y′g if g ∈ [1,m]
1 if g = m+ 1
and
Ψ̂(vt, Bt)g =

1[[g ∈ Bt] if g ∈ [1,m]
vt(Bt) if g = m+ 1 and Bt /∈ Lvt
−H if g = m+ 1 and Bt ∈ Lvt
.
These definitions allow us to prove the following lemmas about the bundles B′ ∈M(v, p). The first
shows that all bundles in M(v, p) are utility-maximizing. The second implies that |M | = 1 and
that e(Dq(p)) ∈M(v, p).
Lemma F.1. If B′ ∈M(v, p), then B′ is utility-maximal for v at prices p and B′ /∈ Lv.
Proof. We first show that B /∈ Lv for every B ∈M(v, p). Suppose B ∈ Lv. Then,
Ψ̂(v,B) · ŵp = −H −
∑
g∈B
pg +
∑
g∈B
y′g
≤ −H +
m∑
g=1
y′g
= −H +
m∑
g=1
α · yg
4m ·maxg′ yg′
≤ −H +
m∑
g=1
α
4m
≤ 0
where the final inequality follows from H ≥ 1 and α ≤ 1. Thus, any B′ ∈ Lv will have negative
dot-product. Thus, if there is any bundle with positive dot product, B′ will not be chosen. If
some utility-maximizing bundle B /∈ Lv, it is not hard to show that Ψ̂(v,B) · ŵp ≥ 0. Since e
is encodable, we know that some utility-maximizing bundle is not in Lv. Thus, no losing set will
maximize the dot product.
15The gap might be above one if, for example, the agent’s valuation for each bundle is a distinct even number.
54
We will now show that B′ ∈ argmaxBv(B) − p(B). Since v(B) − p(B) ≤ Ψ̂(v,B) · ŵp ≤
v(B)−p(B)+ α4 for every B /∈ Lv, any B which is utility-maximizing and not in Lv will have larger
dot product than any bundle which is not utility-maximizing, by the definition of α.
Lemma F.2. For any v, p, |M(v, p)| = 1 and {e(Dq(p))} = M(v, p).
Proof. Lemma F.1 implies that any B′ ∈ M(v, p) is not in Lv and is utility-maximizing, so we
know for all B′ ∈M(v, p) that
v(B′)− p(B′) ≤ Ψ̂(v,B′) · ŵp(B′) = v(B′)− p(B′) +
∑
g∈B′
α · yg
4m ·maxg′ yg′ .
For all such B′, the first term is equal (they are all utility-maximizing). Then, let us consider
B1, B2 both of which are utility-maximizing and not in Lv. It must be the case that(
4m ·maxg′ yg′
α
)(
Ψ̂(v,B1) · ŵp(B1)− Ψ̂(v,B2)
)
· ŵp(B2) =
∑
g∈B1
yg −
∑
g∈B2
yg.
Then, since e is encodable, we know there exists a unique utility-maximizing bundle B1 for
which this quantity is strictly positive with respect to each other B2, and that B1 = e(Dq(p)).
Thus, it must also be that |M(v, p)| = 1.
We now prove Lemma 6.12.
Proof of Lemma 6.12. For any sample S of size n, Ψ̂, ŵp are defined as above, and for any vt, M is
defined as above. Lemma F.1 implies that any B ∈M(v, p) is utility-maximizing, and Lemma F.2
implies that M(v, p) is a singleton and agrees with e. Thus, Ψ̂ and the set of ŵp are a linear
prediction rule which correctly predicts buyers will buy the utility-maximizing bundle according to
tie-breaking rule e.
F.2 The existence of an encodable tie-breaking rule for GMBV
Lemma F.3. There exists an encodable tie-breaking rule e = (Lv, y) which
• Always selects type-minimal bundles,
• and always breaks ties in favor of larger type-minimal bundles.
Proof. We need to define Lv and y and prove they indeed always select a unique type-minimal
bundle of largest size, and also that Lv never contains all utility-maximizing bundles. Let yg =
1 + 4
g
4m·4m ,
16 and Lv contain the set of non-type-minimal bundles for buyers with valuation v (that
is, if v(B) = v(B∪{g}) for some g /∈ B, then B∪{g} ∈ Lv). By definition of Lv, e will never select
a bundle which is not type-minimal.
We now show that Lv never contains all utility-maximizing bundles. If there is some bundle
B ∈ Lv, this implies there is some B′ ( B for which v(B′) = v(B), and such that B′ is type-minimal
(thus, B′ /∈ Lv). Since p(B′) ≤ p(B), B′ is also a utility-maximizing; thus, Lv does not contain all
utility-maximizing bundles for any pricing p.
16This corresponds to breaking ties lexicographically over bundles.
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Finally, we show that, for any X , there is always a unique B ∈ X which maximizes Y = ∑g∈B yg,
and that this unique maximizer is amongst the bundles of the largest size in X \ L. Notice that,
for any B,
∑
g∈B yg = |B|+
∑
g∈B
4g
4m·4m ; this quantity is strictly above |B| − 1 and strictly below
|B| + 1, so the candidate maximizers of Y are all of maximum size. Then, each of those has a
unique value of
∑
g∈B
4g
4m·4m , so there is a unique maximizer of Y .
F.3 Shattering arguments
Proof of Theorem 6.14. Consider some sample S = (v1, . . . , vn) of arbitrary valuations which can
be shattered with targets (r1, . . . , rn). By Lemma 6.15, H induces at most
(
n
m+1
) · 2m(m+1) bundle
labelings on a sample of size n. Fixing the bundle label of a given vq fixes the welfare for vq (if B̂
is purchased by vq, her welfare is vq(B̂)). So, fixing the bundle labeling of all of S fixes the welfare
for all of S. Thus, there are at most
(
n
m+1
) · 2m(m+1) distinct welfare labelings of all of S; thus,
there must be at most that many binary labelings of S according to the welfare targets (r1, . . . , rn).
Since S is shatterable,
2n ≤
(
n
m+ 1
)
· 2m(m+1)
so n = O(m2 logm) as claimed.
The proof is identical for unit demand valuations, replacing the 2m possible labels per valuation
with the upper bound of m+ 1 (since, when buyers are unit demand, they will buy one item or no
items).
F.4 Omitted concentration proofs
For this section, we will be referring to loss functions on samples, `(f, x), as well as loss of
those functions on entire samples `N (f) and distributions `Π(f). In the latter case, let `N (f) =
1
|N |
∑
x∈N `(f, x) denote the empirical loss of the function f on a sample N ; in the latter case, let
`Π(f) = E [x ∼ Π] `(f, x) denote the true expected loss of f with respect to Π.
Theorem F.4 (McDiarmid’s Inequality). Suppose X1, . . . , Xk are independent, and assume f has
the property that, for any i, x1, . . . , xk, x̂i,
|f(x1, . . . , xk)− f(x1, . . . , x̂i, . . . , xk)| ≤ ci.
Then,
Pr[|E[f(X1, . . . , Xk)]− f(X1, . . . , Xk)| ≥ ] ≤ 2e−
22∑n
i=1
c2
i .
Proof of Lemma 6.16. This follows from a simple application of McDiarmid’s inequality, noting
that welfare is a smooth function in each argument (i.e., the welfare cannot change by more than
H by changing any one of the sampled valuations).
Theorem F.5. Fix a hypothesis f ∈ F . Let ` be some function defined on samples such that
`(f, x) ∈ {0, 1}, `N (f) = 1|N |
∑
q∈N `(f, q), and `Π(f) = E [q ∼ Π] `(f, q). Then, with probability
1− δ, if |N | = n, for a sample N ∼ Π,
`Π(f)− `N (f) ≤
√
2`N (f) log
1
δ
n
+
4 log 1δ
n
.
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Proof of Theorem F.5. This follows from Lemma B.10 (pg. 427) by Shalev-Shwartz and Ben-David
[2014].
We now prove Theorem 6.13, which is a direct corollary of Theorem F.5.
Proof of Theorem 6.13. Applying Theorem F.5 and taking a union bound over all possible loss
values on the sample (that is, using Sauer’s Lemma in conjunction with Theorem F.5 rather than
the standard Hoeffding bound).
Proof of Theorem 6.2. This follows from Theorem 6.13 along with the bound of sg + 1 on `S(hg,p)
and the bound on VCHg given in Theorem 6.11. Thus, we have proved the first statement of the
theorem. The second follows from the first, with basic algebra.
Theorem F.6. Fix a hypothesis f ∈ F . Let ` be some loss function defined on samples N drawn
from Π, such that `(f, x) ∈ [0, H]. Then, with probability 1− δ, if |N | = n,
`N (f)− `Π(f) ≤
(
H3/2 log 1δ
n
)(
1
3
+
√
19n`N (f)
)
Proof. Let αi =
`Π(f)−`(f,xi)√
H
be the (normalized) difference between the true error of f and the
error of f on sample xi. Then, applying Bernstein’s inequality to the negative of the αis, we have
that for any t < 0,
P
[
m∑
i=1
αi < t
]
≤ exp
(
− t
2/2∑n
g=1 E
[
α2g
]
+H · t/3
)
≤ exp
(
− t
2/2
n√
H
· `N (f) +H · t/3
)
= exp
(
−
√
Ht2/2
n · `N (f) +H3/2 · t/3
)
.
Setting the right-hand side to equal δ, and solving for t, we have
log
1
δ
=
√
Ht2/2
n`N (f) +
H3/2·t
3
⇒ t ≤ H
3
log
1
δ
+
√
H2 log2
1
δ
+
18`N (f)n log
1
δ√
H
≤ H
3
log
1
δ
+
√
19 ·H2 log2 1
δ
`N (f)n
≤ H
3
log
1
δ
+H log
1
δ
√
19`N (f)n
≤ H
3
log
1
δ
+H log
1
δ
√
19`N (f)n.
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As
√
H
n
∑n
i=1 αi = `Π(f)− `N (f), this implies that with probability 1− δ,
`N (f)− `Π(f) ≤
(
H3/2 log 1δ
n
)(
1
3
+
√
19`N (f)n
)
which proves the claim.
Theorem F.7. Consider a hypothesis class F , and `(f, x) ∈ [0, H]. Then, with probability 1 − δ,
if |N | = n, for all f ∈ F ,
`N (f)− `Π(f) ≤
(
H3/2PDF log 1δ
n
)(
1
3
+
√
19`N (f)n
)
.
Proof of Theorem F.7. Applying Theorem F.6 and taking a union bound (that is, using Sauer’s
Lemma in conjunction with Theorem F.6 rather than the standard Hoeffding bound).
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